Two things stand out from an Indian point of view: India is pivotal to some of the most consequential minilateral arrangements today, and Delhi is keen on straddling both sides of the geopolitical divide. The reason behind Delhi’s multi-aligned minilateral approach is geography. Positioned in South Asia, part of the Global South, and next to a rising China, India sees value in diversification over placing all its eggs in one basket.

Minilateralism is on the rise today for several reasons. The primary reason is the failure of multilateralism and the emergence of global challenges that lack effective global governance, which is driving the current push toward minilateral forums. The second reason is the rise of new powers and their desire to be regional poles in the international system. So, in a way, minilateralism is multipolarity lite: Minilaterals give rising powers the multipolar feeling, though not quite the real thing.

Minilateral frameworks are also a product of the search for trusted partners in an age where predatory economic practices and strategic interests often disguise themselves as trade or economic opportunities. Trust, therefore, becomes essential for ensuring reliable economic transactions. With the decline of multilateralism and growing uncertainty surrounding global institutional frameworks, trust has emerged as a vital component of both international relations and trade. As multilateralism continues to erode, countries will increasingly turn to trusted partnerships to navigate these challenges.

Minilateralism is also driven by the search for secure trade and commerce, even as security has become a core business interest like never before. Geopolitical and security considerations are today central to discussions of geo-economics and technology. Moreover, in an era of global political upheavals and unpredictable outcomes, countries are actively reducing overdependence on any single nation for foreign direct investment (FDI), sensitive technologies, and markets. Trusted partnerships are gaining prominence, as nations acknowledge that not all trade is good trade, not all FDI is good FDI, and not all technology is good technology. This is where trusted minilaterals come in.

India’s approach to multilateral organisations displays four broad characteristics. First, India’s participation in multilateral frameworks is born out of concerns about the challenges facing multilateralism. For India, multilateralism provides a partial answer to the problems of multilateralism but not a complete one, as Delhi continues to prefer a reformed multilateral order over abandoning it entirely.

Second, Delhi views minilateralism as a vehicle to promote multipolarity and its participation in these frameworks as a strategic pathway to securing a key position in a reformed multilateral order. For Delhi, reformed multilateralism and multipolarity are the ultimate objectives, with minilateralism providing a pathway to achieve them.

Third, contemporary India de-emphasises ideology, favouring an interest-based approach over rigid ideological alignments. For instance, while it proactively engages with the Global South, it has shifted focus away from platforms such as Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) or G77. India is also not inclined towards an overtly anti-Western or anti-US stance, maintaining a more balanced position. That is why institutions like the expanded Brics may become less central to Delhi’s strategic calculations over time.

Fourth, India seeks to take the Global South along by identifying with its concerns, a stance shaped by its historical context and the strategic focus on China. It champions South-South cooperation and uses its participation in major platforms like the G20 to bring attention to Global South issues. Positioned as a developing country with significant stakes in the global order, India is crafting a new Global South identity for itself, leveraging diverse minilaterals to strengthen this role.

Finally, India adopts a nuanced approach to security and defence minilaterals, carefully avoiding those that are extensions of formal security alliances. It also remains uneasy about giving minilaterals a defence-oriented character, as seen in its hesitation towards initiatives like North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)+. There are, however, two issues with our minilateral future. One, rising minilateral forums could make the world more participatory and democratic. At the same time, their undeniable geopolitical undercurrents could intensify global competition and localise its impact, sharpening conflicts in specific regions. Second, while a bottom-up approach to global governance has its merits, the reality is that many of the challenges we face today are inherently global in nature and require global solutions.

Minilaterals, by definition, are not geared to addressing global challenges given their focus on a limited agenda, narrow geographical scope, and interest in issues that align with the shared interests of their partners. In this sense, the very strengths of minilateralism — focused, local, agile, and cooperative efforts — are also its key disadvantage.

Happymon Jacob teaches India’s foreign policy at JNU, and is the founder of the Council for Strategic and Defence Research. The views expressed are personal