Unexpected results in Haryana, Maharashtra likely to upset BJP

The Haryana and Maharashtra state elections have thrown up unexpected results and will upset the Bharatiya Janata Party for a variety of reasons. First, it fails to retain a clear majority in Haryana, where the formation of the next government is left to back door negotiations and horse trading. Compared to 2014, the BJP improves its vote share by 3 percentage points. But compared to the 2019 general elections, it sees its vote share dip from 58% to 36.3%, a spectacular fall. The reconfiguration of the opposition and an unexpected performance by the Congress lead to a net loss of seats for the BJP. This result is particularly surprising, given the amount of infighting within the opposition parties and the half-hearted campaign by the Congress in Haryana.

In Maharashtra, the BJP retains its majority, thanks to its alliance with the Shiv Sena. The BJP loses nearly five percentage points of vote share compared to 2014, performing worse within an alliance than when it fought the state election on its own. This has led to a loss of more than 20 seats, which reduces the gap with the Shiv Sena and, therefore, reduces its bargaining power vis-a-vis its most troublesome partner.

The Congress can rejoice with its performance in Haryana, where it increases its vote share by nearly a third, gaining around 15 seats.

The infighting between the Kumari Selja and Ashok Tanwar factions did not spell the predicted doom and the party succeeded in filling a bit of the void left by the collapse of the Indian National Lok Dal. The Jannayak Janata Party, henceforth the new legatee of the old Bansi Lal political tradition, also surpassed expectations by wresting 10 seats.

The Congress performance in Maharashtra, however, is disappointing. Most of the opposition gains have been captured by the NCP, which led a vigorous campaign. The Congress is now firmly established in the fourth position in the Maharashtra party hierarchy, trailing behind its once junior partner.

In the absence of information on the determinants of voter decisions in both states — we can only speculate about the role or impact of economic factors, or the relative strength of the BJP’s nationalistic appeal — one can list the political factors that might have contributed to shape these two outcomes:

The first one is a depressed participation. In Haryana, turnout dipped by eight percentage points, leading to the lowest participation rate since 1991. One cannot tell precisely who those absentee voters are, but one can surmise that it played to the advantage of more mobilised social groups, such as Jats, who are the core of the support base of both Congress and JJP in that state.

In Maharashtra, turnout decreased by 2.4 percentage points, more so in urban areas. It is not clear at this stage who took advantage from it, since all four major parties have in fact lost vote share compared to the 2014 state elections. It is significant that roughly one voter out of four has opted for a party or candidate other than the four major players. This is indicative of the strength and resilience of local politics and of local factors across the states. About 10 independent candidates won their race and 11 other parties, including AIMIM and Prakash Ambedkar’s Vanchit Bahujan Aghadi, will get representation in the new assembly.

The second factor is alliance performance. Since the Uttar Pradesh outcome of 2019, it has become clear that pre-electoral alliance arithmetic is not a simple matter of vote share addition. Vote transfers may or may not take place equally among partners. The Shiv Sena made the most of its partnership with the BJP, which scored lower than when it contested the election on its own. The NCP gained from vote transfers from the Congress to a greater extent than its partner, which did not lead a forceful campaign. The BJP and the Shiv Sena ran with separate manifestos, and the Congress and the NCP barely campaigned together.

One drawback from shifting from a non-alliance position to an alliance is that it produces a lot of discontent among those who cannot rerun owing to the new seat sharing agreement.

In Maharashtra, 121 candidates ran on a different party ticket than five years ago, out of whom only 26 were incumbent MLAs. As many as 61 have been fielded by major parties and the other half by small parties. Of these 121 turncoats, NCP fielded 16 turncoats, Congress fielded 9, against 20 and 21 for the BJP and the Shiv Sena, respectively. Nine of the 16 BJP turncoats ran on NCP tickets, particularly in the Khandesh area, where the BJP suffered heavy losses.

At the time of writing this article, 38 of those 121 turncoats seem to have won, mostly on BJP and Shiv Sena tickets (13 and 10 seats respectively). Only six turncoats fielded by the NCP have won, against three for the Congress. In total, 15 of the 26 incumbent turncoat candidates won.

Parties in Haryana have fielded 47 turncoats, out of which 15 won. Unsurprisingly, the largest number of defectors came from the INLD (23, including 8 incumbent MLAs). Only one of six candidates who defected from the BJP won, while the two Congress defectors who ran on a BJP ticket won. An examination of the votes will reveal to what extent these rebels have harmed their party of origin, beyond the net losses of seats.

Electoral geography constitutes a fourth factor. In Haryana, the fact that the support bases of the Congress and the JJP did not overlap helped them in their contests against the BJP. The Congress has held its position in the Sonepat and the Panipat districts, and reclaimed large parts of the the Ambala, Yamunagar and Panchkula districts in the North, where the JJP was not a player. The JJP performed well in the Jind, Kaithal and in parts of the Hisar districts, traditional strongholds of the INLD. As a result, there were relatively few triangular races, which would have played in favour of the BJP.

In Maharashtra, the Congress and NCP performed well in the Vidarbha region, which has staunchly supported the BJP in the last two elections. The BJP-Shiv Sena consolidated their presence in the Khandesh region and in the Konkan, but lost ground in the Marathwada region. Last spring, the constituencies that were the most affected by rural distress had supported the BJP the most. That did not repeat itself in this state election, where voters tend to hold the state government more accountable for their economic situation.

Finally, there is no doubt that the campaign also mattered. The BJP fought this election almost exclusively on the same national issues that contributed to its success in May.

The disappointing return it received shows that a party that wilfully ignores state and local issues and that reduces regional leaders — including chief ministers — to a role of national spokespersons will underperform in a state election. This should serve as a warning to the BJP’s high command, which remains reluctant to campaign on issues where its performance leaves much to be desired.

The fact that the Congress resurfaced despite a poor, disorganised and uninspiring campaign shows that its fate does not lie in its own hands. One can argue that the Congress’ performance proceeded more from voters’ realignment around the BJP than as an outcome of its own strategic and organisational capacity. This could lead the Congress high command to believe that it only has to wait for the resurgence to take place, which would almost certainly be self-defeating in future elections.

These two elections show that even in the context of one-party domination, the same campaign and the same rhetoric produce different results in different states and in different types of elections. This should ensure that elections in India remain competitive, and that voters retain the capacity to do and undo the fortunes of political parties.

(Gilles Verniers is assistant professor of political science and co director, Trivedi Centre for Political Data, Ashoka University)