Grand Strategy: Three strongmen and the world order, 80 years apart
If the great power consensus remains between Russia and the US, India may have little to worry about. But, if it includes China, it could be a cause for concern
On February 18, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia to initiate negotiations aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war which this month marked three years. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a telephone conversation presumably to discuss the war and the Riyadh talks. On the same day, several European leaders and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau travelled to Kyiv in a show of solidarity to Ukraine, embattled and abandoned by the Trump administration. Notably, they were neither invited to the Riyadh meeting nor consulted by the US ahead of those negotiations. Nor was Ukraine consulted or invited to the discussions aimed at ending a war in which it is a key party.
A little history
In February 1945, exactly 80 years ago, three strongmen leaders -- US President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin -- met at the Yalta resort in then-Soviet Crimea to create a new world order. And they did: They broke up Germany, and decided to set up a new international organisation, the United Nations, which materialised later that year. The San Francisco Conference brought delegates from 50 Allied nations from April to June 1945, drafted the charter for a world organisation.
However, it was ultimately the victors of the Second World War—led by the three strongmen—who effectively established a new world order. Historically speaking, this was the height of the great power solidarity which would soon end with the start of the Cold War. For Russians, Yalta continues to symbolise their great power past; for some sections of the US too, particularly Trump and co., Yalta is the way to global stability. For a lot of Europeans, especially the Poles and the Baltic states, this meant being thrown to the vagaries of the Cold War and spheres influence, just as they were recovering from Nazi occupation and the harsh realities of the brutal world war.
The US-Russia talks are expected to pave the way for a summit between Trump and Putin, allowing them to put their personal stamps on an end to the war and outline a post-war settlement. Given Trump’s conciliatory stance towards China’s Xi, it is possible he could be brought on board—even if indirectly—regarding the deal, with details expected to emerge over time. The Russia-US talks unequivocally acknowledge the argument made by a lot of analysts and decisionmakers including many in India that the war was a result of the great power rivalry (meaning NATO expansion into Russia’s sphere of influence) and therefore the only way to end this is to have conversations between Moscow and Washington.
More so, this ‘great power conversation’ is also expected to tackle another pressing concern within the international community: the breakdown of arms control discussions between the US and Russia, alongside the absence of structured mechanisms for ensuring global stability. To that extent, US-Russia conversations are a good thing considering that this could potentially lead to great power concert and reproachment.
But peace and stability under what conditions? The fact that Ukraine has so far found no place on the negotiating table is clearly worrisome considering the human cost it has had to bear in the last three years. Moreover, Europeans who stood with Washington over the past three years feel abandoned by the new administration, both regarding their own security and in their support for Ukraine.
This sets a dangerous precedent at several levels: for one, this is bound to lead to a massive rearmament process in Europe, and the American credibility among its allies will fall dramatically. How will its Asian partners, South Korea and Japan, for instance, respond to this? What about Taiwan? If the US’ abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan showcased America’s untrustworthiness, the situation in Ukraine has solidified that impression for the foreseeable future.
Unlike 1945, those left out of the Jeddah conferences are not without options, nor are they all war-torn and economically ravaged. More so, the deep rupture in the trans-Atlantic consensus will not be a problem for Europe; it will be damaging for the US too in the long term. However, “long-term” considerations don’t necessarily align with Trump’s decision-making style. While Europe’s ability to sustain Ukraine’s war efforts is severely limited without American support, it may push back, choose not to cooperate with Trump, avoid engaging with the Russians, and seek to disentangle itself from the American security relationship.
The real worry would be the reinstatement of spheres of influence or the creation of new ones as a result of the great power conversations. Put differently, while a decision by the US, Russia and China to peacefully co-exist is good for the world, such a world would prove to be ruinous for a large number of middle, rising and non-aligned powers including, perhaps, for India. Would the US, for instance, give China a carte blanche for China in Asia? How will that shift the India-China balance of power and what will that mean for the Indo-Pacific? A three-way US-China-Russia deal could present significant challenges for New Delhi.
If the great power consensus remains between Russia and the US, New Delhi may have little to worry about. However, if this consensus extends to include China, it could be a cause for concern for India.
On February 18, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met in Riyadh in Saudi Arabia to initiate negotiations aimed at ending the Russia-Ukraine war which this month marked three years. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping held a telephone conversation presumably to discuss the war and the Riyadh talks. On the same day, several European leaders and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau travelled to Kyiv in a show of solidarity to Ukraine, embattled and abandoned by the Trump administration. Notably, they were neither invited to the Riyadh meeting nor consulted by the US ahead of those negotiations. Nor was Ukraine consulted or invited to the discussions aimed at ending a war in which it is a key party.
A little history
In February 1945, exactly 80 years ago, three strongmen leaders -- US President Franklin Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin -- met at the Yalta resort in then-Soviet Crimea to create a new world order. And they did: They broke up Germany, and decided to set up a new international organisation, the United Nations, which materialised later that year. The San Francisco Conference brought delegates from 50 Allied nations from April to June 1945, drafted the charter for a world organisation.
However, it was ultimately the victors of the Second World War—led by the three strongmen—who effectively established a new world order. Historically speaking, this was the height of the great power solidarity which would soon end with the start of the Cold War. For Russians, Yalta continues to symbolise their great power past; for some sections of the US too, particularly Trump and co., Yalta is the way to global stability. For a lot of Europeans, especially the Poles and the Baltic states, this meant being thrown to the vagaries of the Cold War and spheres influence, just as they were recovering from Nazi occupation and the harsh realities of the brutal world war.
The US-Russia talks are expected to pave the way for a summit between Trump and Putin, allowing them to put their personal stamps on an end to the war and outline a post-war settlement. Given Trump’s conciliatory stance towards China’s Xi, it is possible he could be brought on board—even if indirectly—regarding the deal, with details expected to emerge over time. The Russia-US talks unequivocally acknowledge the argument made by a lot of analysts and decisionmakers including many in India that the war was a result of the great power rivalry (meaning NATO expansion into Russia’s sphere of influence) and therefore the only way to end this is to have conversations between Moscow and Washington.
More so, this ‘great power conversation’ is also expected to tackle another pressing concern within the international community: the breakdown of arms control discussions between the US and Russia, alongside the absence of structured mechanisms for ensuring global stability. To that extent, US-Russia conversations are a good thing considering that this could potentially lead to great power concert and reproachment.
But peace and stability under what conditions? The fact that Ukraine has so far found no place on the negotiating table is clearly worrisome considering the human cost it has had to bear in the last three years. Moreover, Europeans who stood with Washington over the past three years feel abandoned by the new administration, both regarding their own security and in their support for Ukraine.
This sets a dangerous precedent at several levels: for one, this is bound to lead to a massive rearmament process in Europe, and the American credibility among its allies will fall dramatically. How will its Asian partners, South Korea and Japan, for instance, respond to this? What about Taiwan? If the US’ abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan showcased America’s untrustworthiness, the situation in Ukraine has solidified that impression for the foreseeable future.
Unlike 1945, those left out of the Jeddah conferences are not without options, nor are they all war-torn and economically ravaged. More so, the deep rupture in the trans-Atlantic consensus will not be a problem for Europe; it will be damaging for the US too in the long term. However, “long-term” considerations don’t necessarily align with Trump’s decision-making style. While Europe’s ability to sustain Ukraine’s war efforts is severely limited without American support, it may push back, choose not to cooperate with Trump, avoid engaging with the Russians, and seek to disentangle itself from the American security relationship.
The real worry would be the reinstatement of spheres of influence or the creation of new ones as a result of the great power conversations. Put differently, while a decision by the US, Russia and China to peacefully co-exist is good for the world, such a world would prove to be ruinous for a large number of middle, rising and non-aligned powers including, perhaps, for India. Would the US, for instance, give China a carte blanche for China in Asia? How will that shift the India-China balance of power and what will that mean for the Indo-Pacific? A three-way US-China-Russia deal could present significant challenges for New Delhi.
If the great power consensus remains between Russia and the US, New Delhi may have little to worry about. However, if this consensus extends to include China, it could be a cause for concern for India.
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