On August 28, after months of speculations, Foxconn’s founder Terry Gou announced his candidacy as an independent contender for the 2024 Taiwan presidential election.

This marks Gou’s second attempt at entering the presidential race. In 2019, after stepping down as Foxconn’s chairman, Gou initially sought the nomination of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s main opposition party. However, the KMT eventually selected Han Kuo-yu, the former mayor of Kaohsiung, as its presidential nominee. This year, Gou once again vied for the KMT’s nomination, which was ultimately secured by Hou Yu-ih, the current mayor of New Taipei City and a former police officer.

On August 28, after months of speculations, Foxconn’s founder Terry Gou announced his candidacy as an independent contender for the 2024 Taiwan presidential election.

This marks Gou’s second attempt at entering the presidential race. In 2019, after stepping down as Foxconn’s chairman, Gou initially sought the nomination of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan’s main opposition party. However, the KMT eventually selected Han Kuo-yu, the former mayor of Kaohsiung, as its presidential nominee. This year, Gou once again vied for the KMT’s nomination, which was ultimately secured by Hou Yu-ih, the current mayor of New Taipei City and a former police officer.

To qualify as an independent candidate, Gou must collect a minimum of 290,000 signatures, which accounts for 1.5% of the electorate in the last legislative election. This signature collection process must be completed by early November.

If he successfully meets the requirements for his presidential candidacy, it will significantly influence the voting dynamics. This development would transform the presidential election into a four-way contest, with Gou entering the race against the incumbent Vice President Lai Ching-Te from the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Ko Wen-je, the Chairman of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP), and KMT’s Hou.

Gou is a vocal critic of the DPP but his candidacy is poised to have a more detrimental impact on the KMT than on the DPP.

At present, according to multiple polls, Lai is leading, trailed by Ko, Hou, and Gou in second, third, and fourth positions respectively. While Gou intends to rally the opposition, his entry into the race is more likely to exacerbate confusion among the pan-blue voters, potentially resulting in the division of votes among supporters of the blue camp.

Gou’s entry could potentially lead to the fragmentation of votes among the pan-blue supporters. Named after the colour of the KMT’s party flag, the pan-blue coalition consists of the KMT and several other minor parties. This coalition premises on the belief that “the Republic of China is the sole legitimate government of the whole of China.” Inside the pan-blue factions, there is a diverse range of perspectives spanning from individuals who promote the reunification of China to those who advocate for maintaining the status quo. If Gou’s candidacy is confirmed, the pan-blue camp is expected to face an even more pronounced state of division.

Gou, who is seen as having a favourable stance towards China, has been critical of DPP’s China policy and believes the ruling party is steering Taiwan perilously close to the brink of war. His attempts to shape public perception include proclaiming that the DPP’s actions could lead Taiwan into a situation akin to Ukraine. Gou has also asserted that his victory could serve as a catalyst for peace in the Taiwan Strait, ultimately contributing to the establishment of stable and harmonious cross-Strait relations. Nevertheless, pushing for this Ukraine narrative might prove counterproductive for Gou, given the resonance it holds among the younger demographic. Several Taiwanese have expressed solidarity with Ukraine and have drawn parallels between their own aspirations and the struggles faced by Ukraine.

Another crucial concern revolves around his business ties with China. Although he stepped down from Foxconn nearly half a decade ago, his perspectives and strategies might still be influenced by his previous business involvements in China, as he undertook substantial investments there while he was still actively involved.

Gou did emphasise that he would not allow China to exert pressure on him but these statements might be met with skepticism, as it is doubtful that many would readily accept this stance. Particularly noteworthy is his assertion that, if elected, his primary focus would be on managing cross-Strait relations, raising questions about his commitment to prioritising the will and interests of the people of Taiwan over his business outlook of China.

The influence of China is deeply intertwined with the upcoming Taiwan presidential election. In the face of China’s growing aggression, promoting the idea of cross-Strait peace will prove to be a challenging task, especially considering the progressive shift among much of the younger generation towards embracing a distinct Taiwanese identity.

The outcome of the 2024 elections will serve as a significant indicator of Taiwan’s future trajectory, providing insights into the prevailing sentiments among the Taiwanese populace.

It is too early to predict who will emerge victorious; for now, what is certain is that Gou’s potential candidacy in the presidential race will inject an additional dose of turbulence into the already chaotic political landscape of Taiwan.

Sana Hashmi is a postdoctoral fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation, and fellow at George H. W. Bush Foundation for U.S.-China Relations.