Iran is sticking to its position of no negotiations under pressure. The Ayatollah, in a meeting with the heads of the three branches of government, argued that the US goal is “not to resolve issues but to exert control and impose their agendas”. At this stage, both sides are posturing and competing for leverage in the run-up to potential talks.

Trump is clear about wanting to ensure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. Last month, when he argued that “there are many people at the top ranks of Iran that do not want to have a nuclear weapon,” he broke from the traditional US-Israeli narrative that Iran’s nuclear programme was fuelled by aggressive and ideological motivations. Trump has also reined in Israeli leaders who see Iran’s nuclear programme as an existential threat and have become increasingly vocal about carrying out pre-emptive strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Iran continues to maintain that its programme has no military dimension and is unwilling to dismantle its nuclear programme. Tehran claims that its accelerated uranium enrichment levels up to 60% purity, close to the roughly 90% of weapons grade, are reciprocal “remedial measures” after the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement. But the advanced nature of Iran’s nuclear programme and reference to deterrence by its military leaders have added to a sense of urgency in addressing the nuclear issue. Iran has long rejected the Libyan model of disarmament of unilaterally giving up its nuclear leverage in the face of US pressure. Amid the weakening of Iran’s “axis of resistance” involving regional allies and the direct exchange of fire with Israel, Tehran has redoubled its focus on its conventional military capabilities. In recent months, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been unveiling underground missile and drone facilities along its coastlines and commissioned new warships and drone carriers.

However, Iran has previously negotiated under sanctions and may respond positively to any plan that offers the lifting of sanctions in exchange for curbs on enrichment activities. Just as Trump returned to the White House, Iran’s reformist government intensified engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and resumed negotiations with the European signatories of the nuclear agreement. Tehran wants to keep the Europeans from triggering the snap-back mechanism or siding with Washington. Tehran has also taken a positive view of Russia and Saudi Arabia’s offers to mediate with the US. The experience under the Biden administration, when Iran engaged in indirect talks to revive the nuclear agreement, has also made it clear that any diplomatic settlement will require direct engagement with Washington. Further, the Israel-Gaza war has made it amply clear that neither side is interested in a full-blown war. This alone should convince them to avoid another escalatory cycle.

Deepika Saraswat is an associate fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. The views expressed are personal