The hegemony of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) has never seemed as complete as it does today. After a brief experiment with a non-IAS chief, the top post at markets regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) has been reclaimed by the IAS lobby. The top post at the RBI (Reserve Bank of India) had already been reclaimed in 2018. The person who reclaimed that post is now at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).

Even during Indira Gandhi’s era of “committed bureaucrats”, there was space for a dissenting outsider such as PN Dhar to become part of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat or PMS (as the PMO was known then). “I hope you don’t become a bureaucrat,” Gandhi told Dhar, when he first joined the PMS in 1970. Today, it is hard to imagine anyone outside the hallowed ranks of the IAS being entrusted with the responsibilities that were once thrust upon the economics professor.

The hegemony of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) has never seemed as complete as it does today. After a brief experiment with a non-IAS chief, the top post at markets regulator, Securities and Exchange Board of India (Sebi) has been reclaimed by the IAS lobby. The top post at the RBI (Reserve Bank of India) had already been reclaimed in 2018. The person who reclaimed that post is now at the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).

Even during Indira Gandhi’s era of “committed bureaucrats”, there was space for a dissenting outsider such as PN Dhar to become part of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat or PMS (as the PMO was known then). “I hope you don’t become a bureaucrat,” Gandhi told Dhar, when he first joined the PMS in 1970. Today, it is hard to imagine anyone outside the hallowed ranks of the IAS being entrusted with the responsibilities that were once thrust upon the economics professor.

The dominance of a few super-bureaucrats belies a dysfunctional culture of governance in which expertise has been systematically devalued. In several ministries, ad hoc consultants know more about policy issues than IAS officers. Ostensibly hired to meet specific project requirements, or as part of project management units, these consultants sometimes end up performing routine tasks of governance. From drafting replies to parliamentary questions to ghost-writing newspaper articles for the secretary, there’s scarcely a task that hasn’t been outsourced to consultants.

Things aren’t any better in state secretariats. Transfers are more frequent, and tenures very short. An officer has scarcely any time to develop expertise in an area. Consultants tend to be even more insecure about their jobs. Their ability to get an extension depends more on ego-management skills than domain expertise.

The current state of affairs is distressing for most people. The civil servant who wants to develop an area of expertise is denied the opportunity to do so (unless a powerful godfather is able to shield them from frequent transfers). The competent consultant who wants to deliver honest advice is not able to do so. Policy decisions are made without adequate scrutiny, and then keep getting revised. The ultimate losers are India’s hapless citizens and firms, who suffer the consequences of ad hoc policy changes.

Like other ills facing the nation, the lack of expertise in bureaucracy is often blamed on the British Raj. But our foreign rulers valued expertise, especially on matters relating to economic administration. A section of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) officers was earmarked for a central economic management pool during the Raj, and posted at key economic ministries. Some of the notable economic administrators during the early years of India’s Independence — such as S Bhoothalingam and LK Jha — were the products of this pool.

In his 1984 report on reforms in economic administration, Jha argued that such specialisation should be revived.

“India is probably the only large, industrialising country in which an elite generalist civil service virtually monopolises the top jobs with so little expertise,” former civil servant Prabhu Ghate wrote in a 1998 Economic and Political Weekly article. “The job of the top civil service in any system is policy analysis. However, the system has been allowed to develop in a way that impedes the development of policy skills.”

Ghate’s words ring true even today. One way to build expertise in governance would be to break up the IAS into two divisions — a field division (IAS-F) and a policy analysis division (IAS-P).The IAS-P division should have more liberal norms of entry and exit, so that people with relevant skills from academia or the private sector can become part of this cadre. People from this cadre should, in turn, be encouraged to work outside the government for some time, and such work should be considered favourably during their appraisal.

An open door policy in government is often resisted on the grounds that it might lead to conflicts of interest.

But such issues can be managed through appropriate policies on conflicts of interest. It is quite likely that people with “outside options” would be able to resist undue political pressures better than those without such options. It is important to make this new cadre a flexible and non-exclusive one. People from the IAS-F cadre should be allowed to crossover to the IAS-P cadre after they have been suitably re-trained.

People from other central services, such as the Indian Economic Service (IES) and the Indian Statistical Service (ISS), should also be allowed to crossover to the IAS-P cadre. They should be appraised and rewarded on the basis of the policy innovations made under their watch, and not on the basis of their seniority.

Without radical reforms, India’s elite civil services will continue to remain knowledge-proof, and citizens will continue to bear its consequences.

Pramit Bhattacharya is a Chennai-based journalist. The views expressed are personal