PM Sharif’s delegation included virtually all senior Pakistani cabinet ministers. Interestingly, the delegation also included the army chief, General Asif Munir. His inclusion was justified on the ground that he is a member of the Special Investment Facilitation Council. This body was set up to invite foreign investment in Pakistan. While Sharif held roadshows to attract investment, it is unlikely that the army chief confined himself to discussing the economy.

Pakistan’s priority is to seek Chinese support to tide over its worsening economic situation. It is in the midst of negotiating a $6 billion, three-year credit facility from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF would like to ensure that its credit is not used to simply pay off Chinese loans. It would require a rollover of the Chinese debt payments, not only for the current year but for the duration of the new credit facility to be negotiated. A longer-drawn-out repayment schedule is crucial to the survival of the Sharif government. How far will China go to bail out its client State? The joint statement is silent on the Chinese response.

Pakistani endorsement of the Chinese position on Taiwan has been a feature of all past statements. This year, the paragraph went beyond previous commitments. Does it only reflect Pakistan’s abject dependence on China? Or does it also reflect China’s geopolitical compulsions? Since last year, China has escalated cross-straits tensions. After the election of Lai Ching te as Taiwan’s president, it intensified military pressure on Taiwan. It needs diplomatic support for the unilateral change it wishes to bring about. Pakistan seems to be only too willing to provide it. The joint statement mentioned, “Both sides stressed that the authority of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 brooks no dispute or challenge”. This resolution was adopted in 1971 when Communist China replaced Taiwan as a member of the United Nations and as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The fact that China needed to recall it half a century later in a joint statement with Pakistan, a country that is facing an existential economic crisis, tells us something about the resistance its strong-arm tactics have generated.

The joint statement mentioned that Pakistan “firmly supports the Chinese government’s every effort to achieve national reunification and opposes any form of ‘Taiwan independence’”. Pakistan’s enthusiasm for supporting the Chinese position on Taiwan could complicate its position vis-à-vis the United States (US). Pakistan needs US support to secure the IMF deal. The US enjoys a veto in the IMF.

The paragraph on South Asia includes a reference to the “opposition to any unilateral action”. This veiled reference to deletion of Article 370, was also there in the statement issued during PM Imran Khan’s visit to Beijing in February 2022. The paragraph reflects the limits of the relationship, which is shaped by Chinese interests rather than Pakistan’s priorities. While Pakistan briefed the Chinese side about the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, the Chinese side limited itself to repeating the old mantra that “it should be resolved in accordance with the UN Charter, relevant UN Security Council resolutions and bilateral agreements”.

Before the visit, Pakistani media briefings raised expectations about the launch of the second phase of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC II). Contrary to initial claims of Chinese investment to the tune of $46 billion in Pakistan under the programme, it has brought $25 billion since its launch. The joint statement is limited to “upgrading” the existing programme rather than announcing big-ticket items.

In the meantime, Pakistan has been elected for a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2025-26.

DP Srivastava is a former ambassador and the author of Forgotten Kashmir: The Other Side of the Line of Control. The views expressed are personal