Some accounts imply a qualitatively new situation may be dawning in Pakistan and some kind of invisible tipping point has been crossed. Yet howsoever serious the deterioration in Pakistan’s internal security over the past 15-18 months, the fact remains that Pakistan’s internal security situation was far worse in the pre-2015 period. The current situation is, in fact, somewhat anomalous. While in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas in Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the security situation has evidently eroded, in the rest of the country the situation is unlike the loss of public morale following the numerous terrorist attacks in major cities in the pre-2015 period. The fact Pakistan was able to host a major international tournament such as the Champions Trophy, in howsoever truncated a form, after a gap of a quarter of a century marks this change.

Yet internal security has been only one vector in Pakistan’s recent history. In the current context there are a number of other moving parts of great significance. Firstly, the economy. Over the past six to eight months the fiscal situation has stabilised — inflation is down, foreign exchange reserves are up and the fear of default that had so dominated Pakistan’s news cycle in 2022 and 2023 has receded. All this notwithstanding, its position is fragile since the economy’s various structural issues remain by and large unchanged.

The political situation also remains static. Imran Khan remains in jail, the political system remains polarised and, more importantly, the concert of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) with the military is very unpopular.

The external front also remains dismal. Most unsatisfactory from the Pakistani point of view is the interface with Afghanistan. A recent column in Dawn had bemoaned “(a)s our military and civilian leadership grapple with the failure of the Afghan policy, an honest introspection and soul searching is overdue”.

But introspection is not evident; blaming bad luck or fate seems the chosen option. So is blaming the Taliban for their perfidy and lack of gratitude rather than a clinical analysis of policy failure. Finally, the constant and Pavlovian raising of the India hand inhibits any introspection.

The current uptick in terrorist attacks is clearly related to the oxygen both the Baluch insurgents and the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have drawn from the return of the Taliban to Afghanistan. In addition, Pakistan’s security analysts argue, both groups have access to a cache of the latest weaponry and equipment from the huge stockpiles the United States (US) left behind as it retreated in disarray in 2021. This may explain the fresh intensity to their operations and attacks.

Yet whatever the reasons, the upsurge in their activities is clearly related to a foreign policy issue — Afghanistan. No amount of kinetic operations can remedy that basic fact. In Baluchistan, a heavy-handed securitised approach has been yielding diminishing returns for some years now.

What adds novelty to Pakistan’s basket of very well-known and familiar woes is a new geopolitical context. This change is the extent of international disinterest in Pakistan and the cocktail of issues and challenges it faces. This has its roots in the US and western disengagement from Afghanistan after the Taliban victory. New issues such as Ukraine or the situation in West Asia now dominate the West’s mind space.

For most Pakistanis, and particularly for those who make up its strategic community, that its geopolitical location now suddenly seems to matter so little is a new situation. To put it more cynically, the inability to extract geopolitical rent upends many of the older assumptions that underwrote its overall foreign and security policy. This situation has made the relationship with China even more valuable. But the fact also is they are having to grapple with a new approach to deal with this novel context. In the absence of an answer and clear strategy, Pakistan’s decision-making elite looks strangely adrift.

In this context, what has also remained static are relations with India. The reiteration of the Line of Control ceasefire in 2021 introduced stability which continues. But it is a minimal stability. Diplomatic relations are downgraded, contacts are minimal, trade absent and the occasional polemical exchanges continue. The expectations that the successful Jammu and Kashmir election or the window provided by a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting in Pakistan would lead to some kind of a thaw, have remained just that — expectations.

The Indian stand continues to be a preference for holding Pakistan at arm’s length and letting this minimal relationship continue. This approach is undeniably informed by a healthy dose of realism. The fact that the powerful diplomatic-cum-political initiatives of 2014 and 2015 had no positive outcomes cannot be forgotten. The dangers from cross-border terrorism remain formidable.

Each of these truths has, however, to be balanced or at least nuanced by others. The minimum relationship with Pakistan as it presently exists is insufficient for promoting greater stability in our region. If the latter is in our overall interest, then an arm’s length policy with Pakistan needs also to be reassessed.

TCA Raghavan is a former Indian high commissioner to Pakistan. The views expressed are personal