The conflict directly affects India not just because of its physical proximity to the AA’s areas of operation, but also its unique interests in Rakhine and Chin States. Adding to the imbroglio is New Delhi’s complicated historical relationship with the Arakanese revolutionaries.

A bitter past

By the early 1990s, just a few years after the Burmese military brutally crushed opposition protests, India downsized its support for pro-democracy forces and began working with the junta to protect its own strategic and economic interests. But New Delhi continued to liaise with ethnic rebels in Myanmar to keep a tab on anti-India insurgents in Northeast India and Chinese activities in the Bay of Bengal.

Exactly twenty-six years ago, in February 1998, some three dozen of these ethnic revolutionaries from Myanmar reached Landfall Island, located at the northernmost tip of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, on speedboats. It wasn’t a joyride. Their contacts in the Indian Army — specifically, one Lt Col Biswajit Singh Grewal — had promised them safe haven in India in exchange for their services. But, instead of silver, the rebels got the lead, according to news reports at the time.

On arrival, Indian troopers led six of these men into the woods. They were never seen again. The rest were detained and shipped off to mainland India. Later, the army’s local commander told the Indian government they had launched “Operation Leech” to bust a Burmese gun-running network, as the home secretary at the time, BP Singh, said. But National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) officials have a different narrative: The Indian army, which allegedly invited them to Landfall, betrayed them.

Among those who disappeared in Landfall’s shadowy forests was General Khaing Raza, the legendary leader of NUPA, the predecessor of today’s AA in Rakhine State. The rest of the arrested rebels were released from Kolkata’s Presidency Jail only in 2011.

Needless to say, the Arakanese revolutionaries never forgot what they still see as India’s great betrayal. Raza’s memory lingers on in their collective memory, offering inspiration, but also quietly fuelling indignation against New Delhi. In February 2023, some local activists organised a memorial service for Raza in his hometown of Minbya during which they recalled India’s role in his murder. Only last week, in a profound vindication of Raza’s legacy, the AA captured Minbya.

“Operation Leech” was likely undertaken at the behest of the Myanmar military, but for India, it severely dented India’s relationship with the Arakanese revolutionaries.

More bitterness

Between February and March 2019, the Indian and Myanmar armies undertook “Operation Sunrise” — a quid pro quo counterinsurgency campaign along their border. The Myanmar military raided the camp of the anti-India National Socialist Council of Nagaland, Khaplang (NSCN-K) in Sagaing Region. In return, the Indian army mobilised assets along the border in southern Mizoram to help its Burmese counterpart neutralise camps run by ethnic rebels.

Among these ethnic rebels, were those belonging to the AA who had set up camps in southern Chin State and had begun challenging the Myanmar army. This was hardly a bother for India, except that some of these camps sat near New Delhi’s flagship, the multi-crore Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit and Transport Project (KMMTTP), which aims to connect eastern to northeastern India via western Myanmar.

Through “Operation Sunrise”, India signalled to the AA that it would use defensive force to protect its assets. In fact, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, which keeps track of such acts of violence using media reports as well as government documents, the Indian army, at the Myanmar military’s request, killed five and apprehended 8-10 AA rebels two years earlier. According to sections of the media, the AA led by Twan Mrat Naing, was a threat to Indian interests; that the AA was armed with Chinese weapons only deepened Indian misgivings.

To make matters worse, in November 2019, a 60-year-old Indian man working on the Kaladan project in Chin State’s Paletwa township died in the AA’s custody, likely of a heart attack. Relations with Delhi soured further.

As a result, the AA occasionally obstructed India’s project activities in their areas of operation. Soldier-scholar, Jaideep Chanda, in his book Irrawaddy Imperatives, lists seven instances in the 2019-20 period when the AA either physically attacked Kaladan project assets, indicated their discontent against India or demanded “protection tax” from India.

India’s dilemma

Clearly, India and the AA are not the best of friends. But, the 2021 putsch in Myanmar has further muddled the dynamic.

The AA, since November, has gained control of vast swathes of territory northwards of the Rakhine State capital of Sittwe until Paletwa in southern Chin State. This has made the group more critical to Indian interests than ever before. India controls a Kaladan-linked port in Sittwe, inaugurated jointly with the Myanmar junta last May. Paletwa, which has an inland river terminal, is a critical Kaladan node too.

India needs the AA’s goodwill to resume work on the project. This gives the AA additional leverage over India, given that it is already close to China. However, the AA too would seek a working relationship with New Delhi as a guarantee against military action by Indian forces along the border, if not to seek shelter inside India.

How India navigates its historical baggage with the AA, now juxtaposed over a very complicated conflict landscape in western Myanmar, remains to be seen.

Angshuman Choudhury is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for Policy Research and focuses on Northeast India and Myanmar. The views expressed are personal.