Trump’s maximalist moves must eventually meet friction, and China is much better prepared today than it was during the first Trump administration to deal with the consequences. When that happens — and just as possible, even if it does not — at least two structural problems in the India-China relationship will resurface as a source of tensions — the boundary dispute and the role of the US.

One effect of China’s economic and geopolitical rise and India’s inability to keep pace has been the decreasing likelihood of a resolution of the boundary dispute between the two countries. India’s constraints are all too visible — a military slow to reform, limited diplomatic capacity and economic resources for foreign aid and assistance, unpopularity in its own neighbourhood, a risk-averse domestic industry, and a political class unwilling to bite the bullet on external trade agreements. As a rule, therefore, the Chinese do not see why they should compromise on the boundary dispute or any other issue for that matter.

Disengagement of troops from friction points at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has been declared complete but de-escalation and de-induction appear to have been pushed off the public radar altogether. Without the latter steps, the restoration of the status quo that existed before the Chinese transgressions of 2020 will remain incomplete and continue to generate pressures within the country , including from the Indian military, for restitution of some kind.

On the Chinese side, the Indian military’s failure to respond adequately to the 2020 transgressions will only encourage further adventurism when the next opportunity presents itself.

Meanwhile, the question of Tibet is at the heart of the Chinese insecurity over the boundary with India. There is no doubt that China’s degree of control over Tibet has strengthened over time. It also has a clear post-Dalai Lama strategy — of ensuring only its choice can succeed to the position — backed internally by assiduous rewriting of historical facts and religious norms, and externally by constant pressure on world capitals and sustained public diplomacy.

Even so, India’s unwillingness to acknowledge China’s expansive claims of historical control over Tibet will keep boundary tensions with India alive. The immediate aftermath of the passing of the Dalai Lama will be a particularly sensitive time in India-China relations and the likelihood is high that any unrest within Tibetan regions will be blamed on India and become another occasion for tensions at the LAC.

Several contradictions exist in the India-US relationship including over what a security relationship in the Indo-Pacific should look like and, even though talks on a trade deal are on, also on the economic relationship. New Delhi, nevertheless, believes the US is a necessary partner in helping balance against China. This then is another significant reason why India-China tensions will continue to fester.

China considers itself a major global power and as being in existential competition with the US. It has increasingly differentiated itself from the US-led West in terms of its political and economic development model.

In this context, Beijing’s frequent references to New Delhi’s policy of “strategic autonomy” are simply code for concerns about India abandoning this perceived neutrality in favour of the West. Thus, Indian commerce minister Piyush Goyal’s recent statement terming American tariffs an “opportunity of a lifetime” and attacking China for undermining the global economic order with its unfair trade practices will only solidify the view in Beijing that the India-US relationship is aimed against China.

For India, the challenge is that despite many disagreements, there are also points of agreement with the Chinese on the need for alternative political and economic development models and for the reform of global institutions currently dominated by the West. There are rules of global governance — such as on climate change — that can only be enforced and advanced if India and China can work together. Other rules — on the management of Artificial Intelligence, for example — that are yet to be written will also be more equitable and sensitive to Global South interests only if New Delhi and Beijing find greater alignment of views.

However, we come back to the issue of the power differential between the two countries. The record — comprising both domestic discourse and external behaviour — suggests that China seeks hegemony in Asia and global dominance. The nature of its regime does not allow for long-term compromises or the acceptance of genuine multipolarity. Recent positive statements from the Indian side on the relationship with China or Chinese references to the “dragon-elephant tango” cannot obscure this fundamental reality.

April 1, 2025, marked the 75th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between India and China. Both nations have used the run-up to the occasion to recover a semblance of normalcy in their ties after the events of 2020. Structural problems, however, persist. The unresolved boundary dispute and the US factor will continue to be a source of tensions in the relationship. Amidst multiple global uncertainties, this much is a certainty.

Jabin T Jacob is associate professor, Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, and director, Centre of Excellence for Himalayan Studies, Shiv Nadar University. The views expressed are personal