In three world capitals, the gaze turns inwards

The fundamentals in the India-China-United States (US) triangle are in place.

Both Delhi and Washington DC, for different reasons, don’t like Beijing’s power, assertiveness and ambitions. Both are taking steps independently, together, and with a set of partners in the region and beyond, to pool their capabilities to deter China — not always, but more often than in the past. Beijing doesn’t like Washington DC’s dominance or Delhi’s rise. On its own, and with the few who it can cobble together, it is taking steps to try to alter the regional balance of power in South Asia against Delhi and the wider global balance of power against DC.

The contours of this triangular dynamic, where two is greater than one, will not change. But in international politics, within a broader structure that politicians find themselves in and shape, they live and operate on a day-to-day basis. There is a constant tussle between the short-term, tactical, locally driven imperatives and medium-term, wider, systemic requirements. There is no long-term, for, as Keynes said, in the long run, we are all dead. At this moment, this tension between the immediate and medium-term is particularly acute in all three countries.

Take the US. Joe Biden has brought clarity and method in taking on China. He has put in place a network of partnerships, strengthened American domestic manufacturing, and attacked the ingredients of China’s technological strength. But he also faces a tough re-election next year. To win, besides other factors, he needs to keep the peace globally (the war in Ukraine, where the US is sending money and arms but not troops, is already exhausting the American public appetite for global intervention) and ensure that the economy is on track (fears of recession are receding but the recovery is fragile and inflation remains a top concern). And to do this, having a relatively stable relationship with China, with which the US economy is integrated in intricate ways, within the broader adversarial dynamic, helps.

Take China. Exactly 10 years ago, Xi Jinping inaugurated the phase of Chinese assertiveness with the Belt and Road Initiative. He secured an unprecedented third term last year. But in a rare instance of the political system bowing to public pressure, he had to change course on the Covid-19 policy soon after the party congress. He now confronts the most serious economic crisis China has faced in decades. And his aggression has alienated more actors in the region than China can reasonably take on. There is suddenly a “string of pearls” around Beijing, generating fears of encirclement. To stabilise the economy and ensure he can rearrange the geopolitical chessboard, Xi needs a period of calm.

And take India. Narendra Modi may have started out hoping that he could craft a new relationship with China. But Chumar in 2014, Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2016, Doklam in 2017, Galwan in 2020, eastern Ladakh till today, and the intensified competition in each of the capitals in the neighbourhood, has more than convinced him that Delhi’s principal contradiction is with Beijing. Modi has sought to build domestic Indian manufacturing, defence and tech ecosystems; deepen India’s partnerships with the west, east and south; and hold the line at the Line of Actual Control (LAC). But he knows that India needs time to build its capabilities and bridge the gap, and that’s why China is the only issue on which he has played defence rather than offence. Facing an election next year, he would like a stable border and is probably aware that Beijing can embarrass his nationalist strongman credentials. A period of detente works for him.

And since all politics is local, there is suddenly a set of intensified engagements. If Washington has sent four senior figures (Antony J Blinken, Janet Yellen, Gina Raimondo and John Kerry) to Beijing, Delhi has stepped up its political and military engagement with the Middle Kingdom. China may pretend that this is all unrequited but is perhaps even more vulnerable because the regime’s political legitimacy rests on its economic delivery.

But none of the three actors in the dynamic are under any illusion that the nature of the competition will change. And that’s why, even as engagement has grown, competitive actions have proceeded simultaneously. Washington imposed a set of new tech investment restrictions targeted at Beijing and brought together Tokyo and Seoul, creating another triangle against China. Beijing led the expansion of Brics to showcase it has friends, is continuing to test how far it can push Washington, and hasn’t shown any signs of changing its posture at LAC. And Delhi will continue to deepen its ties with DC, including on the sidelines of G20 where the two sides are expected to deliver a breakthrough on civil nuclear issues; it will host a major Quad summit next year; and it will focus on removing domestic impediments, including by modernising its defence industrial base.

This moment of tactical retreat on all sides, however, has one big danger. Beijing may well interpret Delhi and Washington’s efforts to engage as a weakness. And to shore up its domestic legitimacy in the wake of the economic downturn, the Chinese communists can well resort to ultra-nationalism. Any adventurism will invite a backlash, because neither Biden nor Modi can afford to turn a blind eye to Chinese aggression when their domestic opponents are already criticising them for going soft. China has consistently overreached in the past and any such attempt will have costs. But the big picture at the moment is of all sides in this dynamic turning inwards, while keeping a close watch on each other. There is no full stop in geopolitics, but for a brief window, if all actors behave rationally, there may be a modulation in rhetoric and actions before the next round of heated confrontation begins.

The views expressed are personal