How the world views Article 370 judgment

Many who welcome the Supreme Court (SC)’s judgment on Article 370 say it has settled the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir once and for all. Only the usual culprits — China, Pakistan and the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) — protested, and that is a sign that the rest of the world has accepted the “full integration” of the state into the Indian Union.

Others are more cautious. While asserting that the verdict has removed ambiguity on Jammu and Kashmir’s status — an assertion based on the false assumption that autonomy permits separation — they suggest it is only the first step towards resolving the issue internationally. The belief that Kashmir is disputed between India and Pakistan remains widespread globally, and will only dissipate if India restores statehood, progresses towards building a peaceful and prosperous new Kashmir, and avoids a fresh outbreak of tensions with Pakistan.

Both sets of statements require careful unpacking. First of all, a muted response to the SC’s verdict reflects little. It is not the general practice for the United States (US) and European countries, for example, to comment on other countries’ court rulings, unless they involve nationals from their own country. International responses to the President’s and administration’s actions in August 2019 are a more accurate barometer of where they stand — that human and political rights in Kashmir must be respected and the dispute with Pakistan remains to be resolved. If statehood and even partial freedom of the media is restored and elections held, one source of possible pressure on the Narendra Modi administration might fade, but the other will remain.

True, the Modi administration does have a time-out on Kashmir. While the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas wars continue, few countries will pay attention to what is happening inside India. Unless, of course, either internal or external conflict breaks out, which is unlikely in the short term. Internally, whether armed conflict will grow from sporadic to sustained in the Kashmir Valley is an open question. It takes time for full-scale insurgency to emerge; it took over two years to do so after the botched 1987 assembly election, and the Indian security blanket is far thicker today than it was in the 1990s. Counter-intuitively, militancy in Jammu province might be a greater concern in the immediate term. Even so, as the Indian security forces are well aware, there is a high risk that the 2019 actions and their validation by the SC might harden the Valley’s alienation from the Indian Union, returning the sympathy for militants that had withered during the peace process years of 2002-2011.

Will Pakistan attempt to take advantage of Kashmiri alienation as it did in the 1990s? Though its foreign minister protested the SC verdict, Pakistan’s own political, economic and security crises are likely to preoccupy its leadership until at least the February general election. Pakistan’s non-State actors will attempt to foment cross-border militancy but they may not get the kind of State support to spearhead insurgency that they used to.

A more immediate threat might come from China. China first responded to the August 2019 actions by seeking censure of India by the UN Security Council. When that failed due to opposition from the US and France, the Chinese leadership took unilateral action, capturing Indian outposts in Ladakh’s border regions in May 2020. Negotiations on restoring the status quo ante have been ongoing, with infinitesimal progress.

In other words, while the SC’s validation of the August 2019 actions has not had a significant international impact, it has aggravated tensions with the two countries that occupy parts of the former princely state, implying that initiatives at peacemaking with either or both will continue to be delayed. India’s western borders will, therefore, continue to be volatile.

Looking beyond the immediate, it would be foolish to imagine that the international community is oblivious to what the verdict implies about the nature of institutional checks on the executive in India. Irrespective of their responses on the Article 370 issue, both democratic and undemocratic countries will have noted that the SC has given a green light to the Union executive to override states’ representatives, weakening India’s federal structure. Many of them will remember the fiat by which the August 2019 actions were achieved — the arrest and detention of over 5,500 Kashmiri politicians, journalists and activists, including three former chief ministers — and their concerns over India’s drift towards authoritarianism will increase.

As far as the US and European countries are concerned, the Modi administration could stave off concerns by allying more closely with them on policy in the Asia-Pacific, but that seems unlikely. India is the weakest link in Quad, and the Modi administration’s policy of quiescence towards China shows no signs of change. As far as the Muslim countries are concerned, the Modi administration’s return to India’s earlier position favouring a two-State solution for Palestine might stave off criticism of Article 370, but only if the situation in Kashmir improves.

Until there is an agreement with Pakistan, moreover, the Kashmir dispute remains on the UN’s books as unresolved and thus open to manipulation by countries inimical to Indian interests. Even a best-case version of international responses to Jammu and Kashmir’s loss of autonomy, therefore, can posit no more than “wait and see”. On the whole, they can be characterised as contingent at best and negative at worst.

Radha Kumar is the author of Paradise at War: A Political History of Jammu and Kashmir. The views expressed are personal