Among the targets, Muridke and Bahawalpur stand out. For decades, they have been the main nurseries of terrorism against India. They are the pride of Pakistan’s army, among the hubs protected even from US pressure to dismantle these centres as part of the conditions for assistance to Pakistan.

The strikes did more than hit the heart of the terrorism ecosystem in Pakistan. They sent a message of justice and reassurance to the people in India. It was a signal to Pakistan’s military that India would not be deterred by its threats and will retaliate beyond the boundaries of war-gamed steps. It showed political and military readiness to take acceptable risks. It was a message to the neighbourhood about India’s willingness to use strength to secure its interest and to the world that India was prepared to act on its own. What India has done is not just redraw the pattern of response but take the levers of control on post-attack developments and pre-empt international intervention for de-escalation, which, in the past, left Pakistan free after cosmetic steps to address terrorism.

An operation of this scale inside the territory of a militarily capable adversary requires intensive planning and preparation, not just for the first round of operations, but to achieve dominance and prevail in subsequent rounds of escalation. That our military achieved this state of readiness in just two weeks reflects the vast improvement in its preparedness, logistics and mobilisation. At the doctrinal level, with clear political directives, it has shown its mission is not simply to defend borders or hold territory in a conventional war but proactively secure the nation against the full spectrum of security challenges.

There are officially unconfirmed reports of loss of aircraft but no military casualties. There are civilian casualties along the LoC from Pakistan’s escalated firing. Pakistan’s actual response to the attack remains unclear. Economically fragile and internally unstable, Pakistan’s best-case objective would be to have a limited and controlled response to inflict symbolic damage on the Indian military and engage in perception management that it stood up to India. Pakistan’s support from China may at best be through intelligence, satellite imagery and cyber operations. Others such as Turkey and Azerbaijan cannot materially impact a conflict.

Any major offensive retaliation against India would necessarily involve civilian or military targets. In that case, it would constitute a declaration of a war and Pakistan would have to contend with a full-scale Indian military response. India would achieve overwhelming dominance on the sea, putting Karachi and the economy at risk, will prevail in the air as well, and hold the ground. Notwithstanding Pakistan’s reckless nuclear bluster, it is hard to imagine Pakistan crossing the nuclear threshold. There will be international efforts to put pressure on Pakistan not to retaliate and for India to limit the scope of its military steps. Pakistan, however, may respond with another major terrorist attack on the security forces. There will be cyberattacks.

We have reached out to key countries on the military strikes. There is a better understanding of our right to respond than in the past. We must dominate the battle of narratives not just with governments, but also with the political leadership, media and the public. However, seeking punitive measures against Pakistan may be harder. Sympathy and solidarity do not translate into concrete support, much less for military action. The world begins to equate the aggressor and the victim. Further, as in the past, Pakistan will not face international financial and economic strictures that the West imposes against State sponsors of terrorism. Pakistan has friendly relations with most countries and has some geostrategic and counter-terrorism value for them. India will also have to make a compelling case to the financial action task force (FATF) and the UN Sanctions Committee.

We will have to persuade Western countries to link assistance, trade and investments to genuine dismantling of all terrorist groups inside Pakistan. The Gulf nations, with a huge leverage on Pakistan and their own weariness with turbulence in the region, should also exert pressure on the country. For different reasons, the US, China and Russia should seize the moment to push for a change of course in Pakistan.

Now that we have taken the military step, we will also have to examine at what point we address the IWT issue and in what form. We have legitimate economic, security and technical reasons to exit an unfair treaty imposed on us in a different era. But it also serves as a rallying call for mobilising new recruits to terrorism’s cause and garnering international sympathy.

Even in the heat of this moment, at a time of both celebration and apprehension, it is time to reflect on whether our response will be a sufficient deterrent against the painful cycle of terrorist attacks from Pakistan that imposes a huge political, psychological, security and economic cost on us. We will have to further strengthen our ability to predict, prevent and pre-empt terrorist attacks as the best deterrent. Our punitive capacity through intelligence, military and security capabilities must be expanded and modernised rapidly to achieve total dominance against Pakistan, even as we keep an eye on a major power to our North with enhanced maritime strength. We must continue with progress, prosperity and integration in Kashmir, and prevent social temptations to hold Kashmiris collectively culpable for every attack. Equally, the social unity our nation has shown must be preserved and strengthened. Our long-term objective must also include working with the world for internal changes in Pakistan and for a broader reshaping of our region.

Jawed Ashraf is a retired Indian ambassador. The views expressed are personal