Services, item 41 in List II of the Seventh Schedule, was brought under the jurisdiction of the LG, in addition to the powers he already held over public order, police and land by virtue of Article 233 AA (3) of the Constitution. This change was done by using Article 233 AA (7) of the Constitution, which, in the Centre’s view, empowered Parliament to make provisions to effect or supplement the clauses contained in the article, without resorting to the elaborate process of amending the Constitution.

I am no lawyer and hence cannot express any definitive view on the legal accuracy of this interpretation. However, as a common citizen with considerable experience in dealing with the law and lawyers, I believe that any judgment should be read in its entirety. Paragraph 95 of the judgment does say that “in the absence of law and provision of the Constitution”, the executive power of the LG would extend only to the aforementioned three areas. Whether this is an invitation to the Centre to pass an ordinance extending the powers of the LG to other powers will surely be hotly contested before SC. To me, the dilution of the power of the State, in this case, would lead to the inescapable conclusion that it is possible to take away more powers — indeed, even all powers under List II — without going through the process of amendment of the Constitution.

The apex court appears to have a different view on the role of the state government. In paragraph 63 of the judgment, SC says categorically, “The members of the legislative assembly have been chosen by the electorate to act in their stead. Thus, the legislative competence of the NCTD must be interpreted to give full impetus to the will of the electorate.” Paragraph 106 says that civil service officers are accountable to ministers, ministers in turn to Parliament or the legislative assembly, and the legislators are answerable to the people. Paragraph 111 goes still further: “Therefore, the ideal conclusion would be that GNCTD ought to have control over services, subject to exclusion of subjects which are out of its legislative domain. If services are excluded from its legislative and executive domain, the ministers and the executive who are charged with formulating policies in the territory of NCTD would be excluded from controlling the civil service officers who implement such executive decisions.” This is very much in line with the Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, where the authority for the disposal of business is vested in the minister-in-charge.

As the SC pointed out in its judgment, there is a triple chain of command in a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy, and if this becomes fuzzy, the consequences will be felt by the people of Delhi, who have elected a government with certain expectations. As Vallabhbhai Patel said many years ago, “A civil servant cannot afford to, and must not, take part in politics. Nor must he involve himself in communal wrangles.” In this case, it appears to me that they are being dragged into a political wrangle between the Centre and the LG on one side and the elected state government on the other. This will inevitably lead to inaction and policy paralysis.

In an ideal democratic governance structure, the ministers and the civil servants must work hand in hand. There should be mutual respect and team spirit, not an us-versus-them approach. It is very much the duty of a responsible chief minister to create an atmosphere of trust and goodwill and prevent conflict between ministers and civil servants. It is the role of the governor to support and encourage good practices. It is not his role to engage in conflict with an elected government just because the people chose to elect to power a political party other than the one that has appointed him. I am dismayed to see some governors flexing their muscles in select states at every turn. Throughout my career, I have respected the impartial and benign role that governors have played in government.

The events in Delhi must also be seen in the larger perspective of federalism. Over the years, there has been a creeping attempt to dilute the power of the states and to expand that of the central government. Allocation of resources to the states has been progressively squeezed, and the room given to them to decide and implement their own schemes is increasingly reduced, while the Centre’s revenue sources and scope to spend have correspondingly increased. In a diverse society as in India, state governments, even local governments, are in a better position to devise and implement schemes in tune with the specific needs of each area. What Uttar Pradesh needs may not be what Kerala wants. Even the concept of a so-called double-engine government is essentially a message to the people that they either vote a particular way or stand to lose in comparison with states that choose to vote “wisely”.

Accordingly, the Delhi conundrum is multi-faceted, and the earlier the SC clarifies its position, the better it is for the country.

KM Chandrasekhar is former cabinet secretary and author of As Good as My Word: A Memoir. The views expressed are personal