In 2019, Indian foreign minister S Jaishankar said the Indian government would address the Huawei issue in the bilateral context of India-China relations, calling it a “telecom issue” not a “geopolitical issue”. The Modi government allowed Huawei to participate in 5G trials that December despite pressure from the Trump administration to ban Huawei. While the government progressed cautiously, the domestic debate in India on Huawei was vibrant. Policy positions can be grouped into three broad factions or approaches – self-reliance, globalisation and national security.

Self-reliance proponents argue that the only way to secure India’s 5G networks was to indigenise the 5G ecosystem. For them, network threats emerge from anywhere, not China alone. Advocates of the self-reliance approach believe that India could develop indigenous 5G technology and that the government should facilitate that objective.

Globalisation proponents agree with their self-reliant peers that telecom equipment from other vendors is just as vulnerable as that of Huawei; as a result, national security considerations must not alone dictate India’s 5G choices. India’s 5G rollout must consider the broader impact on the public and economy while safeguarding national security. Therefore, Huawei’s presence in the Indian market will benefit India economically and help manage its relationship with China by fostering economic interdependence. That said, globalisation proponents recommend that Chinese equipment be kept out of India’s critical telecommunications infrastructure to forestall security risks.

For national security proponents, the overriding consideration vis-a-vis 5G is India’s strategic priorities. They regard Chinese multinational corporations like Huawei as mere extensions of the Chinese Communist Party. Huawei’s involvement then ostensibly allows China to gain undue leverage over India’s communications infrastructure, rendering Delhi vulnerable to Chinese coercion. Huawei’s exclusion from India’s 5G rollout could address these concerns. As a recourse, national security proponents call for India to collaborate with like-minded countries like the US to develop its 5G infrastructure. This approach appears to have triumphed now.

The Modi administration is favouring a national security-based policy approach following Galwan. This is evidenced in its patterns and alignments in deploying 5G networks and technology. The Government of India (GoI) issued a National Security Directive for the Telecommunication Sector (NSDTS) to Telecom Service Providers (TSPs) in December 2020. It directed telecom companies to procure equipment from “trusted sources”, practically restricting Chinese firms operating in India. In May 2021, the GoI invited all telecom companies except Huawei and ZTE to participate in India’s 5G network trials. India’s major telecom service providers — Bharti Airtel, Reliance Jio and Vodafone Idea — have all tied up with West-backed telecom manufacturers. Reliance Jio, in its quest to develop an India stack, has partnered with US companies like Qualcomm, Intel, Google and others. This Indian government has adopted a clear strategic perspective of emerging technologies like 5G. However, India’s alignment with the US and its allies and partners is not simply limited to filling a gap left by Huawei. The objectives of their cooperation extend to shaping the global telecommunication sector.

PM Modi’s recent US visit resulted in several agreements to further cooperation on 5G and 6G telecommunications technologies. India and the US have begun collaborating both bilaterally and through the Quad on Open RAN (ORAN) technology to deploy 5G communication networks. The US’s International Development Finance Corporation has agreed to finance ORAN development in India to develop ORAN as a credible alternative for 5G network deployments. Besides technical cooperation, India and the US are increasing policy coordination. The India-US joint statement from PM Modi’s trip to the US “stressed the need to put in place a “Trusted Network/Trusted Sources” bilateral framework. India, through Quad, has backed the Prague Proposals framework that looks to enhance the security of telecommunication equipment and supply chains.

Quad released a set of principles to guide the development of critical technology supply chains. Indian companies are members of the Open RAN Policy Coalition and India is part of the International Standards Cooperation Network, both under the rubric of Quad. The former aims to coordinate national policies on ORAN technology deployment. The latter is an information-sharing network that helps Quad members coordinate telecom standards.

For India, national security considerations now weigh heavily on bilateral technology engagement. Viewing Chinese telecom companies as a national security risk, India seeks investments from — and partnerships with — US and EU technology firms and other partners. This shift in India’s approach has allowed it to broaden and deepen the overall India-US bilateral relationship. Both countries are now poised to complement each other’s domestic and international technology policy efforts.

Nishant Rajeev is senior analyst at the Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University in Singapore; Yogesh Joshi and Karthik Nachiappan are research fellows at Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. The views expressed are personal