Two major fallacies are common even among people who follow India-Pakistan relations closely. First, some argue that a particular set of leaders in Pakistan are more amenable to peace than others. Peace offers made by such leaders, according to this reasoning, should be taken more seriously. So, a Bajwa should be taken more seriously than a Khan, or Nawaz Sharif’s offer is considered more credible than one offered by Benazir Bhutto. However, they hardly provide any ex-ante criteria to distinguish a credible peacemaker from a non-credible one.

Second, some believe that civilian leaders are more motivated to pursue peace than military generals. The army, after all, is a privileged institution in Pakistan and the only way it can maintain its prestige and control over resources is by keeping the conflict with India alive. However, some others argue the exact opposite: That is, peace can only be pursued by the military because civilian leaders are too weak in Pakistan. If a civilian leader tries to pursue peace in India, he or she would quickly be thrown out, after either direct or indirect intervention by the army. Hence, peace can be pursued, if at all, only by a military leader.

All of the above arguments are misleading. To correctly appreciate peace overtures from Pakistan, we should understand the theoretical framework in which Pakistani leaders operate vis-à-vis India. The Pakistani military is indeed a privileged institution and it saps a lot of resources from the domestic budgetary allocations of a poor country. In addition, senior officers in the Pakistani army manage to obtain immense wealth and property as they climb up the ladders of the military profession. Naturally, officers rising in the army see their fortunes linked to the fortunes of the Pakistani military. India is a strong rival that can easily be portrayed as a threat to the political existence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Even if all the territorial wars have been initiated by Pakistan to acquire some or all of Kashmir, India’s mammoth size and suite of capabilities make it easy for the Pakistani army to justify its disproportionate claims on the internal resources of the country. If India and Pakistan are no longer in conflict, there will be no reason for the continued flow of excessive resources toward the army at the expense of citizen welfare in a country as poor, and perpetually bankrupt, as Pakistan. Therefore, all such military officers who have yet to reach their peak positions and wealth would prefer a continuation of conflict with India. They will actively scupper any prospect of peace initiated by either a military or a civilian leader.

There is a good reason why scuppering any peace initiative is easy in Pakistan. Any leader who pursues peace with India can be portrayed by domestic opponents as giving up territorial claims on Kashmir. Given that the Partition of British India happened along religious lines, Indian sovereignty over Muslim-majority Kashmir is seen as an unfinished business of Partition and a massive failure of the Pakistani project. Domestic opponents of peace-makers, therefore, find it profitable to opportunistically collude with army officers to undermine peace efforts with India.

So, can no credible peace offer ever arise from Pakistan? Civilian leaders in Pakistan can indeed pursue peace but their efforts will be quickly undermined either by the army acting in isolation or collusion with domestic political opposition. This is what happened when some progress towards peace was made between Nawaz Sharif and Atal Bihari Vajpayee, only to be followed by the Kargil War in 1999. Similarly, Narendra Modi’s visit to Pakistan in 2015 was followed by a terrorist attack in Pathankot.

However, the possibility of a credible peace offer is low, but not impossible. An army chief who has peaked in his professional career can offer some chance at peace with India. Once a military leader can make no significant progress in his career or wealth acquisition, his fortunes get delinked from the fortunes of the Pakistani army and that of the junior officers who still see the opportunity to rise and make more money. It is no surprise that Bajwa wanted peace late in his second term, after already acquiring immense wealth that was widely reported in Pakistan. Pervez Musharraf, the army chief who planned the Kargil War, actually presided over a period of relative peace with India as Pakistan’s president between 2004 and 2008.

But once military leaders whose fortunes have delinked from that of the Pakistani army pursue peace, they will be opposed by junior military officers and also politicians looking to strengthen their domestic position. Whether it was Khan’s opposition to Bajwa’s peace overtures or Bhutto’s criticism of Zia-ul-Haq losing Siachen under his watch, politicians in Pakistan are not shy to corner army chiefs from hawkish positions. A real shot at peace would be available only when an army chief, who has consolidated his position and can ride roughshod over domestic opposition, is convinced of the dire need to liberate the country’s economic resources from the military’s grip.

Kunal Singh is a PhD candidate at the Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

The views expressed are personal