New START limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads and 700 launchers (heavy bombers and long-range missiles). In reality, each has more than three times as many warheads, categorised as reserves and those awaiting dismantlement. In addition, Russia is estimated to have over 2,000 tactical nuclear weapons and the US, a few hundred. These two still account for over 90% of global nuclear arsenals.

New START, the sole bilateral nuclear arms control agreement in force, was to expire in February 2026. It would have lapsed in 2021 because Donald Trump was determined to bring China into the negotiations, a suggestion Beijing rejected. President Joe Biden’s election enabled the five-year extension, but discussions on a follow-up treaty proved elusive.

On-site inspections (each State is allowed 18 annually) under the treaty have been suspended since 2020, initially due to Covid-19 and then the Ukraine war. Last November, Russia postponed the meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

Putin claimed that his decision resulted from the US wanting to inflict a “strategic defeat” on Russia, and under the circumstances, the idea of nuclear inspections was “a theatre of the absurd”. He blamed Ukraine for mounting drone attacks against Russian air bases that host nuclear-capable strategic bombers, aided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s intelligence. At least three strikes took place in December 2022 at Engels and Dyagilevo air force bases, though no significant damage was reported. Putin also hinted that the US was preparing to resume nuclear testing and declared that Russia would follow.

The Russian foreign ministry has stated that Russia will continue to abide by the (numerical) restrictions mentioned in the treaty. This has quelled apprehensions that Putin was triggering a new nuclear arms race with the US. However, since compliance mechanisms stand suspended and trust is at an all-time low, both States will be willing to believe the worst of the other. Both are engaged in extensive nuclear modernisation programmes exploring hypersonic missiles, glide vehicles, and low-yield warheads. In addition, offensive cyber capabilities and Artificial Intelligence developments create new risks for the integrity of nuclear command-and-control systems.

So far, China has been content with a minimum nuclear deterrent of around 300 warheads. In recent years, it is shifting to a more robust deterrent. Satellite imagery has revealed the existence of four new missile silo sites. In addition, it has tested hypersonic glide vehicles and a fractional orbital bombardment system, indicating that it now seeks to manage nuclear escalation to blunt the US’s nuclear coercive edge. In 2021, the Pentagon concluded that the Chinese arsenal will cross 1,000 warheads by 2030, a widely accepted view. The expectation is that as China enhances its early-warning satellite capabilities, it will transition from its current no-first-use posture to a launch-on-warning mode.

Last year, North Korea accelerated its missile programme, undertaking nearly 90 launches, unveiling the Hwasong-17, with an estimated range of 15,000 km. Activity at the testing site has led to speculation that North Korea may be planning to undertake a seventh nuclear test. Meanwhile, media reports indicate that in Iran, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors have discovered traces of uranium enriched up to 84%, which is just short of the 90% level used to produce a nuclear bomb. Iran has denied enrichment beyond 60% and blamed IAEA for media leaks and unprofessional conduct.

New START is not the first casualty. In 2002, the US unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the erstwhile USSR, which limited the deployment of ABM systems, thereby ensuring mutual vulnerability, a key ingredient of deterrence stability in the bipolar era. In 2019, the US accused Russia of violating the 1987 Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and declared its withdrawal.

Today’s political disconnect is also evident in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the most successful example of multilateral arms control that has become a victim of its success. It succeeded in delegitimising nuclear proliferation but not nuclear weapons. This is why NPT Review Conferences have become increasingly contentious in recent years and failed to reach any consensus. Another multilaterally negotiated agreement, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, was concluded in 1996 but has failed to enter into force even after a quarter century.

Major power rivalry is not new, but the difference is that it is no longer a bipolar world. The old model of nuclear arms control established during the Cold War, shaped by the bipolar politics of two nuclear superpowers, is untenable in the 21st century nuclear multipolar world. Instead, there are multiple nuclear equations — US-Russia, US-China, US-North Korea, India-Pakistan, India-China, but nothing is stand-alone. Further, nuclear rhetoric is rising, raising the spectre of growing nuclear risks.

During the bipolar era, there was a perception that with the advent of nuclear weapons, wars between major powers would be disincentivised. However, the real problem is that nuclear weapons did not create any incentives for conflict resolution. Putin’s speech is merely a reflection of this reality.

Rakesh Sood is a former diplomat who served as India’s ambassador to France and the PM’s special envoy for disarmament and non-proliferation

The views expressed are personal