When the dragon and the elephant try to dance

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s oft-quoted remark—when the dragon and the elephant tango, it benefits not only the two countries but also the world—makes for elegant diplomacy. It’s the kind of phrase designed to attract headlines, suggest harmony, and project a sense of visionary leadership. But for those who have followed the turbulent arc of China–India relations, the statement feels more poetic than practical, more symbolic than sincere.

The dragon and the elephant, of course, are long-standing metaphors for China and India, respectively. Each embodies distinct civilisational strengths: one swift and assertive, the other steady and wise. In theory, a coordinated partnership between these two Asian giants could indeed shift global dynamics. Together, they account for over a third of the world’s population and hold considerable sway in multilateral platforms like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Their cooperation could rebalance the world order, amplify the voice of the Global South.

There is, admittedly, much to gain. China’s manufacturing expertise and infrastructure capacity could complement India’s expanding consumer base and digital innovation. Trade, already significant, could grow in depth and quality if the existing asymmetries were addressed. In climate negotiations, development finance, and global governance reforms, a united China–India front would carry moral and numerical weight. There’s no denying that a constructive relationship could stabilise the region and yield global dividends.

And yet, the reality on the ground tells a very different story. When President Xi speaks of a tango, he glosses over the fact that these two dancers are not even on the same stage. Trust, the very foundation of any partnership, is conspicuously absent. The memories of the Galwan Valley clash in 2020, where soldiers died on both sides, are still fresh in India’s strategic consciousness. Earlier, the Doklam standoff in 2017 served as another stark reminder that the boundary between competition and conflict remains perilously thin.

Beyond the Himalayan border, the tensions run deeper. India’s growing proximity to the US, its participation in Quad alongside Japan and Australia, and its renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific are seen in Beijing as signs of alignment with an anti-China axis. China’s own moves—its embrace of Pakistan, its strategic forays into Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, and its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative—are viewed in New Delhi as encirclement. This is not the backdrop to a graceful dance. It is a stage littered with mistrust, rivalry, and competing visions of regional order.

Even on the economic front, where interdependence often tempers tensions, the equation is uneven. Concerns about cybersecurity, data privacy, and predatory pricing have led India to ban dozens of Chinese apps and scrutinise Chinese investment more closely. Here too, the supposed complementarity feels lopsided.

Then there is the ideological chasm. China’s one-party authoritarianism and India’s democratic pluralism produce not just different domestic policies but fundamentally different approaches to international engagement. These differences are not merely cosmetic; they influence how each country views issues like human rights, press freedom, and global leadership.

Why then does Xi persist with this image of the dragon and elephant dancing? Timing offers some clues. Such metaphors tend to appear after diplomatic flare-ups, as part of a broader effort to cool tensions and restore dialogue. More strategically, China recognises that a hostile India aligned closely with the West would complicate its geopolitical calculus. At a time when Beijing faces growing pressure from Washington and scepticism across Europe, maintaining a semblance of stability with India is in its interest.

But the risk in such carefully crafted metaphors is that they begin to sound hollow. Peaceful language, while welcome, cannot substitute for meaningful change. If China truly wants a dance partner in India, it must be willing to address the core issues—starting with a transparent resolution of the border dispute, a recalibration of the economic relationship, and a genuine effort to rebuild strategic trust.

India, for its part, must continue walking the tightrope between engagement and caution. It cannot afford to be naïve about China’s long-term ambitions, nor should it shut the door on cooperation where interests align. A muscular but measured diplomacy—one that asserts sovereignty while exploring opportunities—remains its best bet.

In the end, a tango is not just a dance. It is a dialogue between equals, based on rhythm, awareness, and respect. As it stands, the dragon and the elephant are not yet dancing. They are circling, cautiously, watching each other’s every step. Whether they find a shared beat or stumble into further discord will shape not just their own destinies, but the future of Asia itself.

This article is authored by Ananya Raj Kakoti, scholar, international relations, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.