As the crisis in Myanmar enters its fifth year, it is essential to reflect on the ongoing conflict that is becoming increasingly complex. The coordinated actions of People's Defence Forces (PDFs), Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have dramatically changed the nature of the conflict in Myanmar. These resistance groups are showcasing their growing power and unwavering determination which has exposed significant vulnerabilities within the military, including significant loss of territory as well as recapturing of territories, low morale among troops and even challenges in recruiting new members. The PDFs and EAOs are emerging stronger with the capture of 80 towns and 200 military bases, in the bordering regions, especially in Rakhine, Sagaing and Kachin. The capture of a key regional military command in Lashio and the Arakan army seizing the last Myanmar military outpost, BGP-5 in northern Rakhine state, gaining full control of the border with Bangladesh signifies a major setback to the military.

As the crisis in Myanmar enters its fifth year, it is essential to reflect on the ongoing conflict that is becoming increasingly complex. The coordinated actions of People's Defence Forces (PDFs), Local Defence Forces (LDFs), and Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) have dramatically changed the nature of the conflict in Myanmar. These resistance groups are showcasing their growing power and unwavering determination which has exposed significant vulnerabilities within the military, including significant loss of territory as well as recapturing of territories, low morale among troops and even challenges in recruiting new members. The PDFs and EAOs are emerging stronger with the capture of 80 towns and 200 military bases, in the bordering regions, especially in Rakhine, Sagaing and Kachin. The capture of a key regional military command in Lashio and the Arakan army seizing the last Myanmar military outpost, BGP-5 in northern Rakhine state, gaining full control of the border with Bangladesh signifies a major setback to the military.

Soon after the military takeover in 2021, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing formed the State Administrative Council (SAC) and formulated a five-step roadmap, which included two provisions, one to reconstitute the Union Election Commission (UEC) and second to conduct a free and fair elections. Since then, the UEC has been reformed, the meetings have been convened with pro-military parties, census has been conducted in a limited way and most importantly, the rules of registering as a political party changed. These changes among other provisions led to the exclusion of the National League for Democracy and 39 other parties from registering. At the beginning of 2024, he emphasised the vision to conduct elections which is expected to gain rigour in the 2025-26. Though the announcement of elections can seem to be a good starting point suggesting that the military is not anti-elections or anti-democratic, but is also reflective of the fact that the military is conditionally democratic. The military has ruled the country for more than seven decades and aims to hold on to its substantive political power. But the regime's plans and methods to hold elections raise concerns about credibility and inclusivity.

Let us look at the constitutional provisions of elections in Myanmar as well as how the military uses these provisions to ensure that it continues to rule indirectly as it did in the previous decade (2010-2020). As per the 2008 constitution, the House of Representatives (lower house) is composed of 440 single-member constituencies. Within this 440-member legislature, 330 are directly elected and 110 are nominated by the Commander-in-Chief from the Defence Services personnel. By law, it is not compulsory to hold elections in the whole territory, with 50% of territory, the elections will still hold legitimacy. The parliament can convene with 50% seats. There are reports that suggest that more than 70 per cent of the territory is held by the resistance forces, which are mostly the bordering regions. So, the military aims to hold elections in the heartland which roughly constitutes 165 towns.

Further the elections can also be conducted over a longer period of time for instance. So, giving space and time for the military to arrange for elections as and when the territory is under its control. Therefore, conducting elections in one third territory over a period of time will also be claimed as free and fair elections. Additionally, the elections will only be held in constituencies with multiple candidates as per the constitutional provisions. And if a sole candidate dies, a fresh election is conducted. The UEC may also decide not to hold elections in areas with unstable conditions. Previously in the 2010 and 2015 elections, and far more widespread in 2020 elections, particularly in conflict-affected areas like Rakhine, Chin, Kayin, Kachin, and Shan states, where ethnic armed organisations-controlled territory, the UEC made decisions about partial election cancellations. If the SAC proceeds with elections, it is likely that the UEC will continue using election cancellations as a tool to manipulate electoral outcomes. They can relocate polling booths to safer locations, which again would be in the military’s interests. Elections are considered valid if at least 51% of registered voters participate and the candidate with the most valid votes wins. In case of a tie, a run-off election is held. So, what is predicted is conduct of elections but also possible run-off elections.

Even the proposed shift from first-past-the-post to proportional representation (PR) is central to the military's reforms, aiming to boost the electoral prospects of the USDP. The PR system is framed as potentially benefiting smaller, ethnic-based parties, as it is assumed that ethnic voters will vote for these parties. However, this outcome is not guaranteed, as the success of these parties will depend on how electoral constituencies are defined, and whether the voting patterns align with the assumption that ethnic parties will not split votes. The new system will involve multi-member constituencies using closed party lists, with a largest remainder method, simple quota, and a threshold for seat allocation. The 330 seats in the lower house will remain, but 25 seats will be moved from ethnic states to the Bamar-majority regions, which could reduce the chances of ethnic parties. The specific details of how seats will be allocated to townships, as required by the 2008 Constitution, are still unresolved. Nonetheless, the UEC has started training officials on the PR system.

And while the SAC is aiming to hold elections, possibly in 2025-26, the SAC is actively pursuing strategies to gain regional legitimacy by selectively engaging with international actors. The UEC has hosted delegations as well as visited several countries, including China, India, Brunei and Russia. These diplomatic exchanges are strategically aimed at bolstering the military’s credibility on the international stage. In parallel, the UEC has implemented restrictive measures, such as obtaining approval from UEC before meeting foreign entities, thereby targeting political parties’ interactions with foreign organisations. This selective engagement is part of a broader strategy to control the narrative surrounding the legitimacy of the elections, positioning the SAC as the recognized authority while limiting the ability of opposition groups and international actors to challenge its actions.

Now the question about the elections credibility and legitimacy is raised. Especially countries in the region will accept the results of the elections, which are of course manipulated, it is essential that efforts are made to rectify this. Here regional countries can ensure that a dialogue is established between resistance forces and military. Anything done or achieved by force will not ensure a stable solution to the ongoing crisis. While there is an urgent need to reform the 2008 constitution to ensure free and fair elections, it is important that the provisions are at least revisited in a limited manner. First, an inclusive dialogue involving all stakeholders is important to bring together concerns and expectations. Second, the elections must include all the 40 parties excluded earlier in addition to others who have emerged as a result of the ongoing crisis. Third, change the way in which the governance is structured in Myanmar. It is important to ensure devolution of power. Currently, the EAOs are holding de jure power and it is time that it becomes de facto. The elections should be held in parallel with devolution of powers, most importantly identifying strong federalism as a key feature of future Myanmar. The decentralisation of power will ensure the functional role of EAOs and NUG and thereby establish a balance of powers and accountability. The role of the military must be to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation but also respect the constitutional mandate of a democratically elected government and federal structure. Democratic principles must be in place but also be functional for a diverse country like Myanmar.

This article is authored by Cchavi Vasisht, senior research associate, Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi.