Given Nepal’s landlocked dependence on India to facilitate essential commerce, issues pertaining to trade and transit issues, routinely flared. But there were deep civilisational, cultural, military and even marital alliances amongst each other, that ensured continuous societal engagement. Indo-Sri Lankan ties may have been tested during the Sri Lankan Civil War and with IPKF operations, but Delhi’s status as the largest trading partner and the immediate responder to any exigency, ensured Indians were viewed favourably, generally. Similarly, Bangladesh did have concerns about the Farraka Barrage and Teen Bigha corridor, and later in managing its own turn towards religious assertions, but Indians were essentially spared accusations of appropriations and malintent. Perhaps, Indian ties with Maldives were most steadfast of all neighbours, given the selfless role played by India during the hostile takeover attempt by mercenaries (Operation Cactus, 1988) etc.

However, it would be naïve to say that perceptions about India wasn’t given to occasional suggestions of interference, giving rise to ‘pro-India’ and ‘anti-India’ labels onto political parties e.g., Sheikh Haseena’s Awami League was believed to be preferred by Delhi, over Begum Khaleeda Zia’s Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and similarly Nepal Congress over Nepal’s Left Parties. Yet Delhi managed the vicissitudes of democratic changes, with difficult regimes of Khaleeda Zia, KPS Oli, Abdulla Yameen or even Mahinda Rajapaksa by restricting inevitable losses within the bilateral equation, to a manageable level. Invariably, strained relations with Delhi led to positing of China as an axiomatic alternative. However, the Chinese infusion into the subcontinental admixture was rarely seamless, as murmurs of ‘debt-traps’ e.g., Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, expansionism in Bhutan or with data of 20% public debt accruing to Chinese in Maldives, surfaced. Yet China was a natural recourse on the rebound, whenever tensions with Delhi escalated.

Sadly, in recent times, tensions between India and its neighbours have regressed beyond standard allegations and deliberations of inter-government exchanges and even China dangling, to the now dangerously metastasised levels extending to civil societies. Historically governments sparred, but people didn’t – but, as was first witnessed in Nepal, the animus and wariness against India has now consumed the average Nepali citizenry. The ostensible economic ‘blockade’ of Nepal in 2015 was a pivotal moment that troubled societal emotions, beyond diplomatese – ‘blockade’ was perceived as a deliberate affront, bullying and personal humiliation of the Nepalese, the contrarian clarifications from Delhi, notwithstanding. The much bandied ‘big-brother’ syndrome that sought to diminish smaller nations, ignoring their sovereign dignity, gripped the Nepali sensitivities. Subsequent fissures like refusing to exchange notes during demonitisation or Agniveer scheme, only worsened perceptions. Today, it is not China but the wounded snapping of civilisational and fraternal ties with Nepali society, that ought to worry us.

Recently, fracas with Maldives too has mutated way beyond the inter-governmental discourse and the spread to civilian citizenry, seems imminent. Beyond the current Maldivian dispensation’s known position on India, their three authority personnel had indeed stated the most despicable comments on the Indian Prime Minister, and the issue was rightfully raised to the Maldivian authorities. Maldivians reacted immediately and substantially, by sacking all three derelict personnel. If ever, there was any optics of a sovereign accepting a mistake and taking remedial action, then it was this Maldivian reaction.

But while the Indian government did well to leave matters without raising the issue any further--a huge tsunami of ‘Boycott Maldives’ (keeping with the cancel-culture of the day) ensued, that was tellingly allowed to persist. India’s fabled ‘soft power’ of Bollywood, corporate czars, media celebrities to troll armies went on a massive overdrive to ‘teach a lesson’ to Maldives, as if it had not accepted its mistake. Portents similar to Nepal where the sense of a bullying ‘big brother’ emerged. The opposition parties in Maldives did back Delhi initially, but that was also pandering to its own reflexive politics. Such defence will also last as long as the Indian rhetoric and narrative doesn’t get beyond the Maldivian gvernment to suggest inflicting pain onto Maldives, and its people.

Chinese impressions in Maldives may come and go (like in Nepal), but the most disconcerting outcome could be the replication of a ‘Nepal’ disconnect in Maldives, in terms of societal disaffection. Maldives, like Nepal, relies disproportionately on India for its economic sustenance and that makes the local sentiment even more susceptible to imagining India flexing its muscle. Realistically, the tenor and phraseology of Indian reaction can moderate if the powers-that-be asks the citizenry to go easy, by clarifying that the Maldivians did take corrective action, then – but it didn’t, and the relentless onslaught continued, and the situation worsened. India needs healthy relations that cannot afford another ‘Nepal’ simply because we are in the driver’s seat as of now, as it is not in India’s long-term interests.

This article is authored by Lt Gen Bhopinder Singh (retd), former lieutenant governmor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry.