To begin with, the estimated 10,000 people demanding the restoration of the monarchy represent approximately 0.033% of Nepal's total 30 million population. Therefore, to say that the demonstrations represent the national mood would be an exaggeration. However, the factors contributing to such demand may resonate with many of the people in the country, and that is the continuing political instability.

With 17 years into a democratic setup, Nepal has seen 13 PMs—none of them having completed a five-year term—and an equal or a greater number of deputy PMs and number of ministers. Beyond everything, in a multiparty setup, no party wants to sit in the opposition, and often, a five-year governance period sees new equations, and none lasting even two years. The top leadership of the mainstream political parties—Nepali Congress Party (NCP), Communist Party of Nepal-UML (CPN-UML) and Maoist Centre Party (MCP), continues to bargain for the top post. As a result, the country has struggled to see a stable government and stable leadership since the advent of democracy in 2008.

In the fifth general elections in November 2022, the Maoist Centre Party—a party that mainstreamed itself into the democratic setup after fighting a guerrilla war against the monarchy and State between1996-2006 and won the first-ever democratically held general elections in 2008—won 32 seats out of 275 seats in House of Representatives. MCP ranked third after Nepali Congress and CPN-UML in seat share, but it managed to lead a coalition government under the leadership of Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda.

Despite not having a clear mandate, the Maoist Centre formed a government in December 2022 with the CPN-UML. Surprisingly, CPN-UML, with its popular political rivalry with the Maoists, agreed to become a junior partner in the government despite having 78 seats in the 2022 elections. But that is how many Westminster parliamentary systems have functioned worldwide, and Nepal seems no different in this case. However, such alliances of political convenience rather than democratic mandates raise concerns about long-term stability and the erosion of public trust in the political process.

Other than the political instability, what has been further worrying in Nepal is the corruption that has engulfed the country. The Global Corruption Barometer ranks Nepal at 107 out of 180 countries. Over the years, numerous influential politicians and high-ranking officials have been implicated in serious corruption scandals, ranging from massive land grabs and illegal property accumulation to scams involving fake refugee documentation and bribery in public procurement. In 2023, Nepali Congress's top leader and former defence and home minister of Nepal, Bal Krishna Khand, was arrested on corruption charges concerning the fake Bhutanese refugee scams.

Khand was alleged to have taken a bribe to send Nepalese people as Bhutanese refugees—many of whom were ordinary citizens deceived with fake documents and false promises of resettlement in the United States. In the 1990s, Bhutan's government expelled thousands of Nepali people whose ancestors had arrived in Bhutan several centuries ago. The Nepali-speaking people, known as Lhotshampas—had taken refuge in Nepal, and countries worldwide, mainly the United States, Canada and Australia, had accommodated them on humanitarian grounds through international resettlement programmes.

Certainly, Khand was a big revelation on the deep-rooted menace of corruption in the country. Still, there were others, too, including Top Bahadur Rayamajh, former deputy PM, who was also arrested in the same refuge scam. Corruption has long plagued Nepali society, but exploiting a humanitarian crisis for personal gain reveals the lowest depths of ethical decay and reflects political public offices being used for more personal gains. At the same time, the justice system in Nepal has come to an erosion point.

Against the current democratic setup, the monarchy remained anarchic but was a stable political and cultural institution that enjoyed unlimited power, mainly due to public support. The monarchy was comparatively stable as it had a hereditary system of passing on the throne, which remained successful for more than two centuries of the Shah dynasty's rule—1768 to 2008. Shah dynasty initially ruled over a small Kingdom of Gorkha in western Nepal, and in the mid-18th century, King Prithvi Narayan Shah led an armed expedition across the Kathmandu valley to unite the smaller kingdoms into one to what is present-day Nepal.

The royals had wealth, military power and the support of a large Hindu population. The traditional belief around the monarchy was that the king was the reincarnation of Lord Vishnu—one of the principal deities in Hinduism—who could not be questioned. Such traditional beliefs were central to the Shah dynasty's legitimacy and cultural power in Nepal.

While the Shah dynasty’s rule lasted for more than two centuries, with an in-between takeover by the Rana PMs from 1846 to 1951—a phase when Shah kings remained namesake rulers—the institution was finally put to rest in 2008, following a decade-long Maoist Insurgency. In 1951, King Tribhuvan Narayan Shah reclaimed absolute control of the country from then PM Mohan Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana after they sought neighbouring India’s help in this regard.

Post-1951, the monarchy experimented with several political systems to avoid global criticism and to comply with the popular demand for public participation in the country’s administrative system. King Tribhuvan Shah introduced a constitutional monarchy with a multiparty and a constitutional system. Nepal held its first general elections in 1959, but the new King Mahendra soon found it challenging to share power with an elected government. Therefore, a party-less panchayat system was introduced, where the king had absolute control over the local bodies—mandated to run the country.

Mahendra's son, Birendra Shah, who ascended to the throne after Mahendra's demise in January 1972, further advanced the panchayat system— a hierarchical governance structure that centralised power under the monarchy and curtailed democratic freedoms. No political activities were allowed throughout the panchayat era—1972 to 1990, forcing many leaders to escape to neighbouring India through an open border. However, by the 1990s, following a People's Movement, King Birendra was forced to reinstate the multiparty system, and a new constitution was drafted in 1991, followed by general elections in the same year.

However, the 1991 constitution reintroduced the provision of a constitutional monarch. In this complex system, even though a new constitution was drafted and democracy was introduced, the monarchy was still the leading actor, certainly more than a constitutional one with no checks and balances. King Birendra ruled the country until his killing in a royal massacre in 2001—allegedly carried out by his son, Crown Prince Dipendra Shah, over a family dispute. Other than the king, eight other members of the royal family were killed. The royal massacre of 2001 was seen as the last nail in the demise of the monarchy in Nepal, giving Maoists a chance to strengthen their fight against the State and monarchy.

After the royal massacre in 2001, King Birendra's brother, Gyanendra Shah, was coronated as the new king. Still, it was a short-lived spell for King Gyanendra because he refused any talks with the Maoists and declared war, followed by an emergency in 2005. Finally, India’s third-party intervention helped forge a peace process that ended the war, paving the way for democracy. While democracy was the outcome of the so-called autocratic rule of King Gyanendra Shah—the last king (2001-2008), why is he seen as the ray of hope? A quick answer to this would be that the pro-monarchy voices support the monarchy as an institution rather than supporting former King Gyanendra, mainly because the monarchy had been primarily a stable institution.

While there is a visible resurgence of royal nostalgia in some sections of Nepali society—especially on social media—the likelihood of the monarchy returning is nil. For one, the core base of monarchist support tends to be small, mostly made up of elite circles and a passionate but limited online presence. What may look like a wave of support online rarely translates into significant numbers on the ground. If on March 09, former King Gyanendra was welcomed by a crowd of 10,000 people, the second major demonstration on March 28 had an estimated 3,000-4,000 people on the ground. Even if the monarchy were restored hypothetically, there is the pressing question of succession.

The former King Gyanendra, now 77, has already stepped back from public life, and even if he wants to be back in the role, his age and health do not make him a viable candidate. However, there is a second one in line who could lead, and he is Paras Shah—whom many remember as a prince but has been in the media for all wrong reasons.

After Paras would be his son, Prince Hridayendra, who is still 22 years old. While he may carry the royal legacy, he has no role in politics and has grown far removed from public life. Many Nepalis on social media have actually called on monarchist supporters to spare the younger generation—especially Hridayendra—from being burdened with unrealistic expectations or false hopes.

At the same time, even the RPP remains internally divided, weakening its influence on the national stage and the political front. More importantly, it is crucial to remember that Nepal’s shift away from monarchy was not sudden but came after a decade-long civil war that claimed the lives of over 17,000 people, as cited in the United Nations report on the Nepal conflict. The transformation required immense national sacrifice, international mediation, and years of negotiation to initiate the peace process People’s Movement in 2006. Given Nepal’s painful and complex journey toward democracy, the idea of reinstating the monarchy now risks undermining everything the country has fought so hard to achieve.

The demands of pro-monarchy forces may not align with Nepal’s current political trajectory as the country continues to evolve toward a more democratic system, even if failingly. A return to an anarchic or authoritarian model of governance under monarchy is neither practical nor desirable—after all, even the weakest democracies around the world have managed leadership changes without dismantling the system itself. That said, public frustration with the current political establishment is legitimate, and it should serve as a wake-up call for those in power—and beyond—to reform their ways and steer Nepal toward a more stable and accountable future.

In today’s Nepal, the momentum appears to favour inclusion, accountability, and democratic values, not a return to the crown. Yet, if there truly exists widespread trust in Gyanendra’s leadership, the most democratic course would be for him to enter mainstream politics, contest elections, and seek a mandate from the people. Then again—kings don’t run for office. They inherit the throne, not the vote, and do not sit in a parliament with those they perceive as commoners.

This article is authored by Rishi Gupta, assistant director, Asia Society Policy Institute, New Delhi.