China’s preconditions for the Dalai Lama’s return include not only renouncing Tibetan independence but also recognising Beijing’s authority over Taiwan. The Tibetan parliament-in-exile swiftly rejected these terms, seeing them as a political trap to force the Dalai Lama into submission. While the Dalai Lama has expressed a wish to visit Tibet before his passing, China’s rigid conditions make any return nearly impossible. More than a goodwill gesture, Beijing’s offer appears aimed at co-opting the Tibetan movement rather than merely weakening it, using the Dalai Lama’s stature to legitimise its rule over Tibet.

At the same time, Tibetan activists continue to push back against Beijing’s attempts to reshape Tibet’s identity. On February 13, 2025—Tibetan Independence Day—student-led groups like Students for a Free Tibet (SFT) launched awareness campaigns opposing China’s use of ‘Xizang’ to replace ‘Tibet’ in official discourse. In a joint statement, SFT, the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), and the National Democratic Party of Tibet called on global institutions to reject this imposed terminology, warning it was part of a systematic effort to erase Tibet’s distinct cultural and political identity. The renaming is not just semantics but an attempt to overwrite history, mirroring China’s repression of Uyghur identity in Xinjiang.

A month earlier, the Tibetan Youth Congress had already drawn attention with a major pro-independence initiative. The TYC concluded a three-month-long bike rally on January 22, 2025, after covering 20,000 kilometres across 20 Indian states. The rally, which began at Bum La Pass on November 22, 2024, was flagged off by Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Pema Khandu and led by TYC President Gonpo Dhondup. It had three clear objectives: advocating for India’s formal recognition of Tibet’s independence, highlighting China’s suppression of Tibetan religion and culture, and calling for global intervention against China’s environmental exploitation, particularly the damming of the Brahmaputra River. TYC members engaged with Indian policymakers, including Members of Parliament and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh leaders in Nagpur, ensuring Tibet’s struggle remained part of political discourse.

Even as China claims to seek dialogue with the Dalai Lama, it is preparing to appoint his successor on its own terms. This strategy follows the precedent set with the Panchen Lama, Tibet’s second-highest spiritual figure. In 1995, after the Dalai Lama identified Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as the 11th Panchen Lama, Chinese authorities abducted the six-year-old boy and installed their own state-approved Panchen Lama, Gyaincain Norbu. The real Panchen Lama has never been seen again. Controlling the Panchen Lama’s position allows Beijing to influence the Dalai Lama’s future reincarnation. If China succeeds in installing its own Dalai Lama, the world could see two rival figures—one recognised by Beijing and another by the Tibetan exile community—deepening the crisis over Tibet’s spiritual and political future.

They cannot own land, obtain government jobs, vote, or acquire Indian passports by default. Though India has granted them asylum since 1959 and allows them to run a government-in-exile from Dharamshala, it has not formally recognised Tibet as independent. China’s insistence that the Dalai Lama can return only under its terms contradicts the principle of voluntary return under international refugee law, which requires such returns to be free from coercion.

The Tibetan issue is more than a regional dispute—it is a test of whether the world will stand up for religious freedom and self-determination. China’s plan—offering the Dalai Lama an ultimatum while preparing to install its own successor—raises urgent questions about Tibet’s future. With the Dalai Lama aging, a power struggle over his reincarnation looms, and Beijing is determined to control it.

Meanwhile, the Tibetan exile community and its supporters must decide how to respond.

For India, which hosts the largest Tibetan refugee population, China’s growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific and along the Himalayan border may prompt a reassessment of its Tibet policy. While New Delhi has historically balanced support for Tibetan exiles with diplomatic caution, shifting geopolitical realities could force a more decisive stance.

Tibet’s struggle is far from over. With younger generations carrying the cause forward and international debates intensifying, Beijing may find that control over Tibet—both political and spiritual—is not as absolute as it hopes. The coming years will determine whether Tibet’s identity survives under China’s tightening grip or if the Tibetan people can reclaim their rightful place in history.

This article is authored by Hriday Sarma. senior fellow, South Asia Democratic Forum, Brussels.