China’s pre-emptive diplomacy in South Asia
This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak and Rakshith Shetty.
In South Asia’s turbulent political landscape, where regime changes often reshape regional dynamics, China has nearly perfected a strategy of proactive engagement. By cultivating ties with both ruling and opposition factions, Beijing insulates its interests from political upheavals, ensuring continuity regardless of who holds power. From the Taliban in Afghanistan to the Yunus-led interim government in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka’s Anura Dissanayake, China’s ability to diversify diplomatic risks and engage a broad political spectrum underscores its calculated approach to securing influence.
The ouster of Sheikh Hasina in 2024, after mass protests, tested China’s adaptive diplomacy. Despite Hasina’s decade-long partnership with Beijing – which saw Bangladesh joining BRI and secure $26 billion in Chinese investments – China swiftly recalibrated. Within weeks of Muhammad Yunus assuming interim leadership, Chinese diplomats attended his swearing-in and promised financial support, contrasting India’s hesitancy. Notably, Beijing expanded its outreach to Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), a historically anti-India Islamist party, with Ambassador Yao Wen praising its ‘discipline’.
This dual approach – backing the incumbent while courting opposition – serves multiple purposes. Economically, China protects its investments in Bangladesh’s ports, railways, and special economic zones. Politically, it counters India’s influence by aligning with factions resentful of New Delhi’s perceived dominance.
Sri Lanka’s Anura Dissanayake, a leader historically critical of foreign influence, presented a unique challenge. Yet, within months of taking office in 2024, Dissanayake visited Beijing, signing a $3.7 billion oil refinery deal with Sinopec and endorsing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project paused under previous governments. China’s charm offensive – emphasising sovereignty and non-interference – resonated with Dissanayake’s anti-western rhetoric, even as he assured India of security cooperation.
Beijing’s success here lies in its tailored diplomacy. By offering debt relief and infrastructure financing without overt political conditions, China appeals to Sri Lanka’s urgent economic needs. Concurrently, it leverages party-to-party ties; Dissanayake’s Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has participated in Communist Party of China (CPC)-led forums, reflecting deepening ideological exchanges. China’s neighbourhood diplomacy prioritises ‘development partnerships’ that blur the lines between economic and political influence.
Beijing’s strategy is rooted in economic leverage, ideological flexibility and long-term strategic planning, which poses a threat to India’s influence in its neighbourhood. Economically, the BRI investments create dependencies that transcend political cycles. In Sri Lanka, China accounts for 20% of external debt; in Bangladesh, it is the largest trading partner. By embedding itself in critical infrastructure – ports, power plants, digital networks – Beijing ensures successor regimes cannot easily disentangle.
Unlike western democracies, China consciously avoids moralising on governance. It engages Islamists, Marxists, and autocrats alike, emphasising ‘win-win cooperation’ and respect for sovereignty. This flexibility allows partnerships with disparate groups, from Nepal’s communists to Afghanistan’s Taliban. China frames itself as a balancing force against India’s regional dominance. In Bangladesh, it amplifies anti-India narratives; in Sri Lanka, it positions BRI as an alternative to Indian-led initiatives. By portraying New Delhi as overbearing, Beijing gains leverage with smaller States seeking a sense of autonomy.
China’s pre-emptive diplomacy in South Asia reflects a cold-eyed assessment of the region’s volatility. By building redundancies into its political relationships, Beijing ensures that no regime change derails its access to markets, resources, and strategic locations. However, this approach prioritises stability for Chinese interests over sustainable development for host nations.
China’s oft-repeated claim of adhering to a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of South Asian nations is increasingly exposed as a strategic façade designed to mask its growing influence and interventionist tendencies. For South Asian States, the challenge lies in leveraging Chinese investments without surrendering policy autonomy. Given that in the battle for influence in South Asia, China finds India as a contender, as opposed to the West in other regions of the world, China carefully studies what could be India’s leverage points in the region. India thus gets portrayed by China as an intruder in the domestic politics of its South Asian neighbours, as is the case in Bangladesh currently. While China maintained excellent ties with former President Sheikh Hasina, and in fact, China was the last country she visited before her ouster, India alone now bears the wrath in Dhaka for being supportive of Hasina. India and its western partners thus must pre-empt Beijing’s moves and influence, which combine not just tall yet opaque BRI promises but also political narratives. The battle for influence is no longer just ideological but comprises domains of economics, politics, culture, and narratives.
This article is authored by Sriparna Pathak, associate professor, Chinese Studies and International Relations, Jindal School of International Affairs, OP Jindal Global University, Sonipat and Rakshith Shetty, research analyst, Takshashila Institution's China Desk.
