In recent months, Pakistan has been grappling with what some analysts have referred to as a “polycrisis” — an “existential” economic crisis, an intense political conflict between the government and opposition leader Imran Khan, and a drastically deteriorating security situation. Pakistan has sought assistance from “friendly countries” and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stabilise its economy and strengthen its ability to pull through the ongoing crisis. While Pakistan did secure an initial approval from the IMF for a $3 billion loan programme on 30 June 2023, mere hours before the IMF agreement expired, overall, this time, international assistance for the country has been somewhat less forthcoming. Most notable was China’s ambivalence to a faltering Pakistan, despite being the country’s largest creditor, and having the ability to restructure its debt and reverse its economic free fall. Despite the rhetoric of an ‘iron-clad, all-weather friendship’ between Beijing and Islamabad, of Pakistan being the fulcrum of China’s South Asia policy, and of the $60 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being the cornerstone of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China chose a ‘wait and watch’ policy on the Pakistan situation, often even suggesting the US is to blame for Pakistan’s current plight. At one point, even Pakistan’s strategic circles—which are rarely critical of China—began to question why Beijing was not doing more to help Islamabad. Significantly, China’s current reticence comes on the back of reported cuts to the CPEC budget (by a substantial 56%) in 2022.

Amid this backdrop, this brief examines Chinese resources—the discourse in the Chinese-language media, discussions on the Chinese internet, and writings by Chinese academics and scholars—to understand the current dynamics of China-Pakistan relations.

The paper can be accessed by clicking here.

This paper is authored by Antara Ghosal Singh, ORF.