b) these organisations do not or might not advance Chinese interests in a way that is commensurate with its rising power and capabilities; and 

c) these institutions might impinge on China’s concept of established norms such as sovereignty. An early example of this effort was the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which was established in 2001. Under the presidency of Xi Jinping, China has begun to advocate for and create new institutions, such as, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), New Development Bank (NDB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that places its geopolitical and geo-economics interests at the forefront.

According to some Chinese scholars, a rising power such as China must not only increase its material capabilities but grow “socially” within the existing international society. Guo Shuyong, an international relations expert at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University states that, “legitimacy plays an indispensably important role in the structuring and socialising of international political behavior....”.In order to rise in a socially acceptable and non-threatening manner, China has focused on creating narratives such as ‘community with a shared future of mankind’ or a ‘community of common destiny’ while also increasingly focusing on making multilateralism a core component of its foreign policy. China’s approach to multilateralism has matured considerably, despite much emphasis on bilateral foreign policy in Chinese diplomacy. Apart from supporting international institutions, Beijing has championed the cause of regional multilateralism by taking the initiative in creating several forums and summits such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean) + 3 forum; East Asia Summit; Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (Brics). 

Assessing China’s role in UN China became a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) in 1971 after the General Assembly voted to expel the Republic of China (ROC). China’s participation in the U.N. is similar to that of its participation in the world order at large - it went from being an under confident outsider at the organisation’s periphery to a self-assertive and confident insider - playing a major role in the organization. Currently, four out of the15 UN specialised agencies are headed by Chinese nationals – the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDP), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). Since 2007, the position of under-secretary-general for the U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) has been held by Chinese career diplomats, giving the Chinese government opportunities to reshape the UN’s development programmes in accordance to its interests. Beijing has also concentrated its efforts in trying to make its BRI synonymous with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. China is the second largest monetary contributor to the U.N. with its contribution rising to 12% of the UN’s regular budget. Not only that, it is also the second largest financial contributor to the UN Peacekeeping budget, now roughly $6 billion a year, covering 15% of costs. Also, with regard to utilising its veto power as a permanent member of the U.N.S.C, China has used its veto power only 14 times. It is important to note that China’s use of veto aligns with its geostrategic interests- for example, China’s vetoed against peacekeeping missions in Guatemala (1997) and Macedonia (1999), since both nations maintained official relations with Taiwan; its veto of a US sponsored resolution criticising Myanmar’s human rights record; veto of sanctions against Zimbabwe and South Sudan; and, it also vetoed a US-drafted resolution to address the crisis in Venezuela, among others. 

Therefore, after examining China’s views of the order and its interactions with the order, the logical conclusion is that China is not an entirely dissatisfied power-- on the one hand, it strongly believes in and guards the conservative concepts laid by the Westphalian system which have been perceived as crucial to the existence of the Chinese state; and on the other hand, China is irked by the standards led down by the West, particularly the US, believing that different nations have different social and political systems which should be respected instead of blindly adopting foreign or even alien standards of normative values, such as those of human rights, democracy and rule of law. China believes in seeking its rightful place in the order-- an order in which it has the necessary power and legitimacy to write and rewrite certain rules and norms according to the Chinese way. In his speech to the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping laid out his vision for a “new era...that sees China moving closer to the center stage and making greater contributions to mankind. “Under the leadership of Xi, China has sought to assert its place as a global power in the world order – sometimes unilaterally and aggressively. The fulfillment of the ‘Chinese Dream’ by achieving ‘great rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation’ also depends on a stable and peaceful international environment. Thus, China’s deepening integration into the international order to realise the ‘Chinese Dream’ also means that it this very order that has provided China with the space to transform itself into a global power. Thus, the distinction China draws is between a “multipolar” order – i.e., one in which non-western countries have a more equally weighted say in setting norms and making decisions within international institutions – and the current order, which China regards as a largely “unilateral” one that privileges the US and its allies.

The study can be authored by clicking here 

 (The study has been authored by Rangoli Mitra)