The convergence of AI with biotechnology has ushered in an era of innovation in drug development, genomics, and diagnostics. AI provides immense scope for interdisciplinarity owing to its ability to “integrate and analyse diverse data sets” from distinct domains. For example, AI has aided in the development of new biomarkers for diagnosing and monitoring the treatment progression of Alzheimer’s disease, the advancement of precision medicine for genetic disorders, and the production of novel biomolecules. Furthermore, AI-biotechnology (AI-bio) tools have the potential to contribute to health security, particularly through their ability to predict public health threats.

However, according to the UN’s Governing AI for Humanity report, the use of AI needs to be governed because “no one currently understands all of AI’s inner workings enough to fully control its outputs or predict its evolution.” Additionally, the report recommends that mechanisms need to be developed to prevent the misuse of AI. Recent media reports on the use of AI to help create pathogens and subsequent policy discussions led to the United Kingdom and the United States acknowledging the potential misuse of AI by malicious actors to create bioweapons. In this backdrop, there is a need to evaluate the real risk of AI-bio capabilities in the Indian context. While AI, in its current form, is unlikely to catalyse the development of biological weapons, policymakers need to be aware of the scope, limitations, and feasibility of this potentiality to ensure effective safeguards against the misuse of these technologies in the future.

This paper can be accessed here.

This paper is authored by Lakshmy Ramakrishnan, ORF.