Understanding the fine print of the Rafale negotiations
Seen in the light of the four issues I have raised, there’s a clear need for further explanation by the government. It certainly seems as if matters weren’t handled properly. Whether that suggests corruption is, however, a different matter. As yet, that’s by no means proven
The revelation that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) was involved in parallel negotiations over the Rafale deal has excited furious press and political interest. However, there seems to be a sharp divide over how significant this is. The issue is simple. Is it a serious embarrassment for the government, as the opposition claims, or is it being exaggerated and misunderstood, as the government insists? But to answer that question one needs to start by answering four others. That’s what I want to do today.
First, was the PMO negotiating or simply involved in discussions? In an interview on television, Air Marshal SBP Sinha, the head of the Indian negotiating team, told me that the PMO was directly contacted by the French government after the Indian and French negotiating teams failed to solve the sovereign guarantee issue. The two governments reached an agreement between themselves to accept a letter of comfort instead of a sovereign guarantee and the Indian negotiating team accepted it. Put like that, the PMO’s involvement seems harmless. After all, whenever two negotiating teams can’t resolve a matter it has to be referred to their two respective governments. That’s all that happened.
However, the defence ministry seriously objected to this. So the second question we need to address is: why? Are there good reasons for criticising the PMO’s involvement? The then defence secretary, in a note written in his own hand and sent directly to the then defence minister Manohar Parrikar, said “It is desirable that such discussions be avoided by the PMO as it undermines our negotiation position seriously.” Now you can’t have stronger words than that. And they come from the top civil servant in the defence ministry. But were his worst fears realised or merely theoretical? The MoD note clearly states they were realised.
This is where we need a bit of detail. The defence ministry’s note establishes that the PMO intervened in two areas, over the sovereign guarantee versus letter of comfort debate and by agreeing that “the implementing court for a decision by (the) arbitration tribunal shall not be specifically Indian”. And what did the MoD note say about these two interventions? The outcomes agreed to by the PMO “are contradictory to the stand taken by the MoD and the negotiating team in both these aspects”. In other words, the PMO’s intervention actually set back India’s interests as viewed by the MoD and negotiating team. This should have alarmed Mr Parrikar. But did it?
To answer that, we need to examine the then defence minister Manohar Parrikar’s explanation for the PMO’s role. Is it convincing or confusing? That’s the third question. Parrikar said the PMO was “monitoring the progress of the issue”. But the MoD note says the PMO agreed to two measures “contradictory” to the MoD and the negotiating team’s stand. That’s clearly not monitoring. In fact, that’s definitely negotiating if not also interfering. And that leads to a fourth question. Was Mr Parrikar covering up for the PMO or did he fail to understand the true significance of the MoD note? This question still awaits an answer.
Seen in the light of the four issues I have raised, there’s a clear need for further explanation by the government. It certainly seems as if matters weren’t handled properly. Whether that suggests corruption is, however, a different matter. As yet, that’s by no means proven. But that, of course, won’t derail the charge that the government has let India down. Nor, unfortunately, is it an effective defence.
Karan Thapar is the author of Devil’s Advocate: The Untold Story
The views expressed are personal
