Actually, Mr Trump’s confidence is misplaced. Chinese companies, investors and workers are not impervious to pain, but they are used to it. Since China first joined the World Trade Organisation a quarter century ago, it has developed a particularly Darwinian version of capitalism, in which companies must tolerate unending rounds of brutal price competition, political meddling, and unclear rights to their own property, intellectual or otherwise. In contrast, American businesses, investors and voters are about to face new and unfamiliar tests of their capacity to endure disruption, whether that involves historic turbulence in financial markets, or sudden shortages of everyday items made in China. For its part, China denies that it is anxious to settle. Asked about Mr Trump’s claims to have spoken to the Communist Party chief, Xi Jinping, the Chinese foreign ministry said on April 28th that it knew of no recent calls between the two men.

Duelling propaganda claims aside, there is evidence that China can withstand quite a bit of American arm-twisting, without changing course. For all the surprises since Mr Trump’s return to power, some policies targeting China were predictable. In mid-April his administration announced a legal investigation into the pharmaceutical trade, and whether tariffs are needed to prod drugmakers to bring the production of antibiotics and other medicines back to America in the name of national security. This was not a surprise. In his first term Mr Trump deplored America’s reliance on imported medicines. In recent years Congress has expressed bipartisan alarm about China being the sole source of some indispensable drugs, such as benzathine penicillin, an antibiotic that is the main treatment for syphilis and some streptococcal infections. Bills have been passed offering subsidies for antibiotic-making in America. Undaunted, in 2024 the North China Pharmaceutical Group, a state-owned giant, began building new production lines for that very penicillin in the city of Shijiazhuang, with a particular focus on exports.

Days before Mr Trump’s re-election last year, your columnist headed to that penicillin plant in Shijiazhuang, curious about this sign of China’s commitment to advanced manufacturing, even as other countries fret about dependence on Chinese suppliers. The yeasty smell of brewing hangs over Shijiazhuang’s drugmaking district: antibiotics are being fermented from grain. A penicillin-plant foreman, grabbing a lunch-hour cigarette, chatted about globalisation as seen from a Chinese shop floor. He is not complacent about Western drugmakers, saying that America has better technology than China. But he sees a more urgent threat from small, cut-throat, local firms. Penicillin-making is a profitable, if low-margin business, and “other people want to make money, too.” In his view, competition is only growing fiercer in China. Small firms poach staff and ignore pollution rules. Still, he has watched big firms sell drugs at a loss of 1,000 yuan ($137) a tonne until smaller rivals go under. Then such “ruthless” giants raise prices again. The key to survival is willpower, manpower and “support from various governments”, explained this sage in blue overalls.

Statistics back up such anecdotes. After the pandemic and a property bust, China’s economy is slowing. In June last year, about 30% of industrial firms were loss-making. Overcapacity is endemic in industries favoured by the state, such as electric car-making. Yet many firms stagger on, backed by local governments and loans from state-owned banks. America’s tariffs are surely unwelcome. But after years of decoupling, America absorbs less than 15% of China’s direct exports, a big drop since Mr Trump’s first term. If tariff-pain hastens consolidation that was coming anyway, China’s leaders can blame American bullying. Laid-off workers will not be heard by the wider public, because of China’s police state, censorship and lack of opposition political parties.

Pain felt by consumers will be unequal. America and China have exempted certain imports from tariffs. Revealingly, Mr Trump has exempted items whose prices worry the public, such as smartphones (though he says new tariffs on electronics are due soon). Reportedly, China is sparing imports that consumers never see, from semiconductors to components needed to build Chinese airliners. If Chinese imports are halted, American shops will soon see empty shelves. In China, American-made goods are rare.

The costs of being an incoherent bully

America will struggle to win a bilateral contest over pain, then. It could do grave damage to China with a war of commercial encirclement. Mr Trump’s team seems tempted by this approach. Reports abound of American officials pushing Vietnam, Mexico and other trade partners to cut China out of supply chains as the price of avoiding swingeing tariffs, or at least prevent Chinese goods from being shipped to America through their countries. Lots of governments long to stay on good terms with America, and have gripes with China’s self-serving trade practices, too. But Mr Trump has undermined his case by bullying his allies, chaotically. If America loses this trade war, its pain will be self-inflicted.