Last Tuesday, when Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina visited New Delhi, hers was the first bilateral visit by a foreign head of government to the Indian capital after Prime Minister Modi’s re-election. It was also Hasina’s second visit to India within two weeks, the first one being part of the neighbourhood leaders who were invited to Modi’s swearing-in ceremony on June 9. She emphasised that the visit will “play a very pivotal role” in strengthening already “excellent relations” between the two countries.

The Indian external affairs ministry (MEA) statement on the Hasina visit points to the regional dimension of the connectivity ties that also sees Nepal and Bhutan, alongside Bangladesh, as important partners in the South Asian subregion, bordering India’s north-eastern and eastern states.

Power and energy collaboration will hold the key to developing intra-regional electricity trade, which will include competitively priced power generated from clean energy projects in India, Nepal and Bhutan through the Indian electricity grid. To this end, the statement explains, India will expedite the construction of the 765 kV high-capacity interconnection between Katihar-Parbatipur-Bornagar with “suitable Indian financial assistance, to act as the anchor for grid connectivity.” This grid corridor will supply electricity from Bihar’s Katihar (not too far from Nepal) to Bornagar in Assam through Parbatipur, Dinajpur district, in northwest Bangladesh.

Hasina’s two quick back-to-back visits to India are a clear indication of the significance Bangladesh accords to ties with New Delhi, not least because she is scheduled to visit China next month. Hence a deft balancing act.

Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia and India is the second-biggest trade partner of Bangladesh in Asia. As importantly, India is Bangladesh’s largest export destination in Asia. But China has also emerged as a key player in Bangladesh, with strong engagement in the economic front and infrastructure development. Bangladesh relies heavily on raw materials from China for its garment industry - its economic lifeline. Military ties have also strengthened in the past decade, with Bangladesh now becoming the second-largest recipient of Chinese arms after Pakistan.

On June 20, India's external affairs minister (EAM) S Jaishankar visited Colombo, marking another first. His first foreign visit in the Modi 3.0.

When Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ made his first bilateral visit to India since assuming office in the current term last May-June, the prime ministers held wide-ranging bilateral discussions to review the entire spectrum of the bilateral agenda covering political, economic, trade, energy, security and developmental cooperation.

The two prime ministers expressed satisfaction at the progress made in power sector cooperation, which covers the development of generation projects, power transmission, infrastructure and power trade and both appreciated the growth in the export of up to 452 MW of power from Nepal to India and the progress made in the construction of the 900 MW Arun-3 hydro-electric project in Nepal.

The two sides also agreed that Nepal will export 10,000 MW to India within 10 years and towards this end “take all necessary measures” to encourage mutually-beneficial investments in Nepal's hydropower generation sector and transmission infrastructure. The Nepali side welcomed India’s decision to facilitate the first trilateral power transaction from Nepal to Bangladesh, through the Indian grid with an export of up to 40 MW.

The Tibet Factor

On June 20, Modi met with a bipartisan group of United States congressional delegation (which included former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi) led by Michael McCaul, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, during their visit to India. The US delegation expressed strong support for further deepening Comprehensive Strategic Global Partnership in all areas, including trade, new and emerging technology, defence, and people-to-people exchanges, the Indian PMO said in a statement.

Earlier, the US lawmakers visited Dharamshala where they met with the Dalai Lama, whom China regards a separatist and the Tibet-government-in-exile illegal. The visit notably took place on the heels of the newly endorsed Resolve Tibet Act by the US Congress. The Act aims to encourage dialogue between the Dalai Lama and China as well as succession of the ageing Dalai Lama, a topic many China watchers believe could make India and Nepal geopolitical flashpoints.

Resolve Tibet Act authorises the use of funds to counter Chinese disinformation about Tibet “including disinformation about the history of Tibet, the Tibetan people, and Tibetan institutions, including that of the Dalai Lama.” The bipartisan legislation now awaits assent from President Joe Biden. This act is the third notable piece of legislation that the US has taken regarding Tibet, following the Tibetan Policy Act or TPA (2002), and the Tibetan Policy & Support Act or the TPSA (2020).

The Resolve Tibet Act challenges the Chinese claim that Tibet has been a part of China since ancient times and urges China to engage in meaningful dialogue with the Dalai Lama or his representatives “without preconditions, to seek a settlement that resolves differences.” Supporters of the Dalai Lama have called the Resolve Tibet Act “a bold successor to the two acts which preceded it.” It also brings issues of Tibetan autonomy to the centre stage of US politics, where it has bipartisan support and, therefore, could invite serious differences with Beijing in the months and years ahead.

The TPA in 2002 took a cautious position in defining the US policy on Tibet. It recognised China’s claim that Tibet was an integral part of China and maintained that the US government did not have any official relations with the Tibetan government-in-exile. The TPSA in 2020 pushed for constructive dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama or his representatives. The new Resolve Tibet Act goes a step further: it urges Beijing to hold talks with the Dalai Lama, or his representatives without “preconditions” on the terms to seek a settlement to outstanding differences.

It remains to be seen how far the Tibet factor will play out in Nepal’s ties with China, not least at a time when Prime Minister ‘Prachanda’ chairs a Maoist party and the largest party in the ruling coalition is the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Maoist-Leninist, or the CPN-UML, both of whom have traditionally shared cordial ties with Beijing. There is also broad support across the political spectrum for the One-China Policy, though Nepal's political and civil society actors are now far more open about questioning Chinese policies. For instance, there's now a broad understanding that Nepal should preferably seek grants from China to finance BRI projects, and if China does provide loans, the interest rates slapped on individual BRI projects should be low (on par with that of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank), instead of giving blanket support to all BRI projects.

What is also likely is that the ageing Dalai Lama, currently in the US for medical treatment, and issues surrounding his succession and Tibet will get a lot more press coverage around the world and in the neighbourhood during Modi’s third term.

Akhilesh Upadhyay is former Editor-in-Chief of The Kathmandu Post and Senior Fellow with the Center for Strategic Affairs at IIDS, a Kathmandu-based think tank. The views expressed are personal