These attacks underscore a few aspects: the heightened operational capability of Baloch insurgents, their ability to hold territory (unseen in previous attacks), a greater inclination to attack government forces and installations which have symbolic and substantial value, and large-scale attacks which take longer than usual for the Pakistani Army to counter.

Who are the Majeed Brigade

Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest but least developed province, has been in the throes of a decades-long insurgency ever since the Khan of Kalat, as Balochistan was once called, Mir Ahmed Yar Khan acceded to Pakistan on March 27, 1948. Since then, it has witnessed several bouts of insurgencies waged by the aggrieved Baloch people with the prevailing phase (the fifth, the lengthiest and by far, the most lethal) having erupted following the assassination of veteran Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, in 2006.

While Baloch nationalism was born out of tribal grievances, it gradually transitioned from rural to urban areas, drawing support from the educated middle class.

The continued frustration among locals of Balochistan primarily arises from the establishment’s kill-and-dump policy, enforced disappearances, abject poverty, and political disenfranchisement. Additionally, a persistent state of exclusion from benefits derived from its resources like natural gas, coal, and gold that are readily made available to other provinces, especially Punjab, adds fuel to the fire. In light of these circumstances, a host of Baloch insurgent groups have assumed the responsibility of liberating the region.

Of all the groups, the BLA remains the most prominent ethnic-nationalist separatist outfit that seeks to attain complete independence for Balochistan. The BLA was banned by Pakistan in 2006 and categorised as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) by the US in 2019. Its Majeed Brigade is an elite suicide squad formed in 2010 by the now-deceased leader, Aslam Achu, in honour of the two brothers, Majeed Langove Senior and Majeed Langove Junior. The former died while attempting to assassinate Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in August 1974, whereas the latter was killed in 2010 while saving the lives of his comrades during a Pakistani Army siege on his residence.

There is no conclusive evidence on who supports the BLA, though Pakistan has variously blamed different countries, from Iran to India.

History of attacks

The BLA carried out its first attack in December 2011, targeting Shafiq Mengal, the son of a former federal minister, who was allegedly running death squads against Baloch activists in some parts of Balochistan under the tutelage of the Pakistani Army. In 2018, it attacked a bus carrying Chinese engineers in Balochistan's Dalbandin, who were working on the Saindak project, a gold and copper mine that has been leased out to the Metallurgical Corporation of China. Since then, it has upped the ante against Chinese interests. To that end, it has claimed responsibility for various attacks, including those on Karachi’s Chinese Consulate (2018), Gwadar Pearl Continental Hotel (2019), the Pakistan Stock Exchange (2020), and Karachi University’s Confucius Institute (2022).

Since the inception of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in 2013, there has been a notable shift in the focus of Baloch insurgents. The crown jewel of this project, Gwadar Port, is located in Balochistan. While they previously targeted symbols of government authority, their recent attacks have increasingly focused on Chinese interests and personnel. The BLA opposes the project, perceiving it as an imperialist endeavour by China, where Beijing exploits Balochistan's resources while also being complicit in the oppression of its people by the Pakistani state. The recurrent attacks have prompted the Chinese Embassy and Consulates to periodically issue safety warnings for its citizens and have led to heavy securitisation of Balochistan, which the locals protest against.

Upon its inception, CPEC was lauded as a game-changer, which carried the potential of enhancing the country’s security apparatus through economic advancements. However, even after a decade of its kick-off, it has not succeeded in benefitting the local population, and many projects have languished due to sit-ins and attacks on project sites. Despite Beijing’s concerns about Pakistan’s efforts to safeguard collaborative projects and its citizens, the attacks are unlikely to deter China from investing further, given its high tolerance for security risks in its investments worldwide. However, active resistance against Chinese involvement as part of Baloch nationalism could strain the all-weather friendship between the two countries.

The way out

The problem at hand is a simple one — that of a resource curse. The Balochistan province, despite being a wellspring of minerals, remains the most underdeveloped in the country. Hence, a military solution to a political and economic problem is, at best, a short-term one.

Additionally, the increasing willingness of the Baloch youth to sacrifice their lives indicates the presence of a strong ideological foundation in their psyche. This has rendered past military operations ineffective in quelling insurgencies, as the government’s display of its military prowess has only exacerbated the issue, leading to a boomerang effect.

As the Pakistani state comes to grips with the grim reality of its internal security, it ideally should be driven to embark on a path of course correction, shifting from security-centric strategies to development-oriented policies. Even though the provincial government lacks the scope and capacity to resolve the crisis — as these decisions are made in Islamabad and Rawalpindi — it has generally been apathetic to the demands of Balochs. Charting the future trajectory of Balochistan’s development would involve prioritising the delivery of good governance to its citizens, which, in turn, requires enormous political will from both the central apparatus and the provincial government.

Bantirani Patro is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.