As an act of retaliation against Pakistan’s aggression, the Taliban’s Defence Ministry announced that its border forces, using heavy weapons, targeted Pakistan’s military posts along the disputed Durand Line, the 2,670-km long border whose legal validity as the legitimate international border is acknowledged by Pakistan, but historically contested by Afghanistan. The Defence Ministry is under Mullah Yaqoob, the son of now-deceased Mullah Omar, who founded the Taliban movement. Recently, the ministry released an image of Yaqoob clad in an army general's uniform, marking a departure from the attire typically worn by the Taliban commanders.

In 2022, Pakistan reportedly conducted air strikes in Afghanistan’s border provinces of Khost and Kunar in April 2022, which resulted in the death of over 45 people. The Taliban stressed it wanted to resolve the issue through “political means,” but the border strikes were an increasing cause of tension between the two countries, the Al-Jazeera reported. The recent Pakistani air strikes, however, have garnered a significantly more hostile response from the Afghan Taliban.

Given Pakistan's history with terrorism, it is unequivocally evident that the country is no stranger to terror attacks perpetrated by militant groups based in the Af-Pak border region, which have led to the loss of its security personnel. So, what explains the recent austere measures espoused by Pakistan against such groups?

Since the Afghan Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in mid-2021 (widely celebrated by the Pakistani establishment), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the former’s ideological offshoot, has entered a period of resurgence, posing a persistent threat not only to Pakistan’s internal security but also to its external environ by straining its relations with Afghanistan. Even as the Afghan Taliban publicly dissuades the TTP from engaging in operations outside Afghanistan and consistently denies any support to the terror outfit, its General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) provides financial aid, weapons, and shelter to TTP militants for operations within Pakistan, Pakistani officials believe. The 33rd Report of the UNSC Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team delineates that the Taliban rank-and-file is not only sympathetic to the TTP’s aims but has also joined the group due to a perceived religious obligation while providing regular aid packages to TTP commanders and their families. It appears improbable that the Afghan Taliban will alter its favourable policy towards the TTP in the foreseeable future, as highlighted by Michael Erik Kurilla, commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), who pointed to the Afghan Taliban’s “little interest” in reining in the TTP, according to the Express Tribune. This, in turn, presents a significant threat to stability in Pakistan’s border regions and carries the potential of destabilising Central and South Asia.

In response, Pakistan has exhausted all non-kinetic means available, such as issuing démarches to its Afghan counterparts and applying diplomatic pressure by repeatedly broaching the matter at international fora to acquire international support, particularly from the U.S. for its war on the TTP. To that end, Munir Akram, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, earlier this month, forewarned the UNSC of the possibility of the TTP becoming a “global threat if left unchecked”. He further urged the body to press the Afghan Taliban to sever its ties with the TTP, emphasising that Pakistan’s future engagement with the Afghan Taliban will be contingent on its commitment to counter-terrorism efforts. However, much to Pakistan’s chagrin, this has not compelled the Afghan Taliban to take concrete steps against the TTP due to which relations between Kabul and Islamabad continue to deteriorate.

At present, Pakistan also seems vehemently opposed to any peace talks with the TTP, as similar attempts in the past had granted the TTP the breathing space to regroup. Moreover, given the Pakistani state’s refusal to meet one of its key demands — a reversal of 2018 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa merger — and in the absence of any substantial trade-offs, the TTP is unlikely to uphold its side of the bargain. In such a scenario, Kabul has witnessed a flurry of visits from the leaders of Pakistan’s religious parties, notably the two factions of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, JUI-F and JUI-S, under the ongoing “religious/ulema diplomacy” to mediate between Islamabad and Kabul amid their deteriorating relations over the TTP. Thus far, their visits have not yielded tangible outcomes; however, they have reportedly returned home with positive messages from the Taliban supremo, Hibatullah Akhundzada, who has purportedly “directed the TTP leadership to review its strategy towards Pakistan and reduce the violence”, the Express Tribune reported. While it is unclear whether these visits will pave the way for another round of negotiations with the TTP (the last ceasefire with the TTP ended in November 2022), they do serve as stepping stones in forging constructive ties between the two countries, especially when they remain at loggerheads with each other over diverging security concerns. Though far-fetched, a more robust relationship, devoid of mistrust, may influence the Afghan Taliban to deny the TTP a permissive haven in Afghanistan in the future.

For now, however, if the Afghan Taliban remains steadfast in assisting the TTP, Pakistan could initiate more over-the-horizon counter-terror operations, attacking suspected TTP hideouts, and suicide camps, and even attempting to strike at individual leaders to disrupt the group’s operational activities. This, however, comes with its own set of challenges — antagonising the Afghan population — a consideration that the Pakistani government must weigh carefully before proceeding with drone attacks, and maintain its precision level to the hilt to prevent civilian casualties and respect the sovereignty of Afghans.

In the coming days, it remains to be seen how Pakistan’s newly elected government of Shehbaz Sharif, who, in the past, has received warnings from the TTP not to act against it, deftly navigates the TTP-triggered security crisis at home and bilateral crisis in its western backyard. This challenge unfolds against the backdrop of Pakistan grappling with multiple crises revolving around its politics, economy and climate change. Will Sharif’s rhetoric of an “all-out comprehensive operation” against the scourge of terrorism, which he had announced during his first stint as the prime minister in April 2023, be matched with action during his second term? His stance on Pakistan's security being uncompromisable and his grit to enforce the state's full writ on every inch of Pakistan's territory was cut short, as his term concluded before he could implement these objectives. Notwithstanding the nature of the operation that will ensue, Pakistan indubitably has to maintain sustained vigilance and bolster the capabilities of its law enforcement officials and security personnel to pre-empt terrorist attacks. More importantly, the government needs to usher in more economic and political stability so as to obstruct further militant activities.

Bantirani Patro is a Research Associate at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed are personal.