Besides the seven MoUs and agreements signed by both sides, there were two prominent outcomes of Modi’s visit to Bhutan. One, Modi announced that India would offer a whopping ₹10,000 crore for the kingdom’s 13th Five Year Plan, which is double the amount New Delhi extended to the kingdom for the previous plan. Two, the Bhutanese king, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, conferred upon Modi his kingdom’s highest national award, the Order of the Druk Gyalpo.

Bhutan’s red carpet welcome to Modi, including the King’s special dinner at the Lingkana Palace, reflects Thimphu’s outward recognition that India remains its closest partner in the neighbourhood. This is in addition to the fact that the Bhutanese prime minister, Tshering Tobgay, chose India as his first foreign destination since taking charge in January. In turn, it’s clear India desires to woo Thimpu and keep it squarely in its orbit.

These mutual expressions of friendship would seem ordinary but for the growing Bhutan-China relations. Beijing has been trying to steadily increase its engagement with Bhutan as part of its pugnacious outreach to India’s neighbours over the past decade. According to noted China scholar, Srikanth Kondapalli, this is also part of a grand irredentist endeavour to revive the dream of early 20th century Chinese warlord Zhao Erfeng to control the five Himalayan states. Needless to say, India, faced with broader Chinese expansion in South Asia, is unnerved.

Most of the Chinese nettling in Bhutan began in 2017 when Beijing’s ingress into the Doklam plateau located at the India-Bhutan-China tri-junction provoked a terse, 73-day military standoff with Indian forces. Since then, according to various reports, such as those published by Reuters in January 2022 and Chatham House in December 2023, China has ramped up infrastructure-building in disputed areas along Bhutan’s western and northern borders. The logic of this salami-slicing is to stake a de facto claim on the disputed territory and eventually establish a permanent Chinese presence.

If India found any assurance in the fact that Bhutan and China had no formal bilateral relations, the needle seemed to shift five months ago.

In October 2023, Dr Tandi Dorji, then the Bhutanese foreign minister in the previous government of Prime Minister Lotay Tshering, landed up in Beijing with a delegation. Three senior Chinese figures in the Xi Jinping administration gave him an audience — vice president Han Zheng; foreign minister Wang Yi; and Yi’s deputy, Sun Weidong. Beijing welcomed and treated Dorji with much warmth, even giving him a tour of historical landmarks in the Chinese capital city. Both sides talked about settling the boundary dispute by expediting the implementation of the so-called “Three-Step Roadmap”, the MoU for which was signed in 2021. But, that wasn’t it. They also discussed establishing formal diplomatic relations.

The joint statement from the Dorji-Zheng meeting noted: “Bhutanese government attaches great importance to the development of relations with China and firmly abides by the one-China principle.” Just months earlier, The Bhutanese carried out a report about the prime minister telling a Belgian journalist that the border dispute in Doklam involved “all three equal” countries China, India and Bhutan. Tshering clarified that his country’s position on the Doklam issue had not changed, but after the interview came out in Le Libre, there were concerns that Thimphu was no longer, according to India a privileged position in regional geopolitics.

While Tshering is no longer in power, India views the boundary talks as China’s way to force Thimphu to give up disputed territory. According to some reports, Beijing is seeking to acquire the Doklam plateau in exchange for territory along Bhutan’s northern frontiers, not very far from the Northeast Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which, too, the Chinese claim for themselves. For India, this would be a strategic catastrophe. Doklam overlooks the Chicken’s Neck — a thin sliver of land connecting Northeast India with the mainland. By grabbing it, Beijing would secure quick and easy access to one of India’s most vulnerable land bridges.

That China has already surpassed India as Bhutan’s largest trading partner also doesn’t help. Add to the mix Beijing’s steady ingress into disputed territory along India’s northern frontiers, especially in eastern Ladakh. Yet, the Modi government’s unmitigated outreach to the Tobgay administration and the latter’s counter-embrace of India reflect the resilience hardwired into India-Bhutan ties. Even with all its military might, China will find it incredibly difficult to dislodge this long-time relationship.

Angshuman Choudhury is an Associate Fellow with the Centre for Policy Research and focuses on Northeast India and Myanmar. The views expressed are personal.