The Kuki Inpi, an influential representative organisation of the Kuki-Zo community, has denied these allegations. In fact, it has claimed that the skirmish broke out as part of a planned offensive by joint forces of the state police and Meitei armed groups against Kuki-Zo volunteers in the Kangchup region.

The drone bombing has sparked an alarmist news cycle around Manipur, even as the state government in Imphal begins an official investigation into what it has labelled an “act of terrorism.” How does one contextualise the use of drones in Manipur within a wider conflict landscape?

Drones in civil conflicts

Weaponised drones capable of delivering explosive payloads were once the sole monopoly of professional state militaries. First used on a large scale by the US in Afghanistan, they were steadily adopted by other types of conflict actors in a variety of forms.

In its Worldwide Threat Assessment 2023, US-based Global Guardian notes that in recent years, non-state armed groups have used armed drones in several conflict theatres, including Ukraine, Syria, Yemen and Myanmar. In most cases, they have used Commercially Available Drones (CAD) to drop bombs of various types, under a broad category of what is now referred to as ‘aerial vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (AVBIEDs).’

The use of armed drones by anti-junta ethnic armed organisations (EAO) and People’s Defence Forces (PDF) in neighbouring Myanmar is notable. Initially used for little more than reconnaissance, these groups are now increasingly relying on drones retrofitted with explosive munitions to attack junta convoys, air bases, police stations, armed units and even military headquarters in the national capital of Naypyidaw. Multiple PDFs directly armed and financed by the National Unity Government (NUG), the parallel civilian administration in Myanmar, now have their own drone units.

AVBIEDs have suddenly become popular among non-state armed groups across the world because they are cheaper than other long-range weapon delivery systems while being stealthy and precise. Moreover, by giving small armed entities the ability to hit targets from the air, they serve to bridge tactical asymmetries common in civil conflicts. However, these are also the distinct qualities of drones that can be misused to launch targeted attacks against unsuspecting civilians.

Drones in Manipur conflict

The alleged drone attack in Manipur’s Kangchup earlier this week might have been the most glaring use of AVBIEDs in the state since the ethnic conflict began in May 2023. But it wasn’t the first time armed drones have appeared in the state since last year.

If some social media accounts are to be believed, Arambai Tenggol, a powerful Meitei militia, used armed drones to attack a Kuki-Zo village in Churachandpur district in December 2023. One particular video published earlier and recirculated by Kuki Inpi after the recent attack claims to show an Arambai cadre retrofitting what looks like a hexacopter drone with a small mortar bomb, flying it and then dropping the payload on an empty field (it doesn’t explode).

In June, Assam Police detained a person named Sanjib Kumar Mishra in Guwahati for ferrying drone parts that were allegedly meant for Meitei armed groups in Manipur. Just a day earlier, another individual called Khaigoulen Kipgen was apprehended with high-end drone batteries supposedly meant for Kuki-Zo groups. In either case, it remained unclear if the parts were specifically meant for AVBIEDs or simple reconnaissance drones.

In November, the Indian Air Force activated its “Air Defence response mechanism” after drone-like objects were spotted hovering around the Imphal airport. Three months later, Licypriya Kangujam, a 12-year-old Meitei climate activist, took to social media to raise money to acquire a “thermal drone” apparently for Meitei armed groups in Manipur.

Need to avoid alarmism

Worryingly, the recent drone incident has been accompanied by unverified claims and misleading images. For instance, the Manipur police have claimed that the Kuki-Zo groups used drones to fire rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). This sounds logistically far-fetched. While it is possible to retrofit a drone with the warhead of an RPG, it is highly unlikely that a whole rocket system was used through an AVBIED. It is also very difficult to trace the exact source of a drone attack post facto given its inherently discreet nature.

Further, as a fact-check by one digital media website has shown, a prominent news anchor from a TV channel displayed images of rocket systems in Gaza as part of a report on the Manipur incident. The same channel claimed that the groups received drone warfare training and material support from Chin armed groups in neighbouring Myanmar who are, in turn, backed by the Chinese.

These are wholly unsubstantiated claims that only deepen the alarmism around the Manipur conflict and help no one. In fact, even in June 2023, some social media accounts circulated a clipped video of what they claimed were Kuki-Zo cadres using armed drones to attack security forces in Manipur when in reality the footage was from Myanmar’s Chin State.

It is possible that the widespread use of combat drones by PDFs and EAOs in Myanmar, some of whom operate close to the India-Myanmar border, has had ripple effects across the border. However, all of them, including the Chin National Front, are occupied in their own war against the junta and have little to no direct contact with the Kuki-Zo armed groups in Manipur.

More importantly, both Kuki-Zo and Meitei armed groups are likely to have benefited from any potential cross-border spillover of drone warfare from Myanmar to Manipur. So, Indian security agencies must work towards suppressing the use of armed drones by all sides in Manipur, rather than using the phenomenon to target just one side.

Angshuman Choudhury is a researcher and writer from Assam, and currently a joint PhD candidate in Comparative Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore and King’s College London. The views expressed are personal