Between October 2023 and April 2024, more than 34,000 have been killed by Israeli operations in Gaza. Evidently, the US position has long shifted – now focusing on limiting the Israeli offensive, negotiating a hostage/prisoner swap and a ceasefire, and re-establishing those structures which will bring enduring stability to the region and yield economic benefits, rather than temporary solutions.

Key to this effort, are the regional powerhouses which are inextricably tied to both the immediate objective of a ceasefire as well as the long-term effort for a stable Middle East. However, compared to Blinken’s last visit in March, the circumstances have changed not in nature, but in scale.

Changes in context – Qatar and Israel

Between Blinken’s last visit in March and now, a ceasefire deal has not only remained elusive (with Hamas continuing to hold over 100 Israeli hostages), but prospects have taken a harder hit. The positions of regional negotiators (including Qatar and Egypt as the chief mediators) have since become strained.

On one hand, on April 17th, the Qatari Prime Minister Al Thani stated that the “narrow political interests” of some parties had “necessitated Qatar to undertake a full evaluation of this role". This arguably referred to Netanyahu criticising Qatar earlier for continuing to host senior Hamas leaders, even as acting as mediator.

However, Doha arguably holds more cards than it wishes to show – CNN’s Nadeen Ebrahim recently argued that Doha is unlikely to back out as a negotiator anytime soon, with its expressions of protest arguably intended to be a reminder of its invaluable position. In fact, it is the unparalleled access that Qatar offers to Hamas’ negotiators that makes Doha an inextricable player – especially for Washington.

Notably, Qatar not only houses Hamas’ political office but also the Al Udeid Airbase – the largest American military facility in the Middle East (with about 10,000 troops) for which Doha and Washington quietly renewed their agreement for an additional 10 years, in early January.

While Qatar dithered momentarily, Washington kept up its correspondence with Egypt to double down on a ceasefire deal – with Hamas publicly acknowledging Egypt’s role in messengering the latest proposal, and Biden talking directly to President Al-Sisi on April 29th.

On the other hand, Israel’s position has grown more intransigent. On March 26, just days after an unprecedented UNSC vote in favour of a ceasefire, Israel withdrew its negotiating team from Doha, after it blamed Hamas for rejecting an earlier deal. Hamas’ demand for a permanent ceasefire directly flies in the face of Israel’s stated goals of eliminating the group completely, with Tel Aviv potentially acquiescing only to a temporary truce with a hostage/prisoner swap.

However, just as Washington is pushing against a Rafah operation, Netanyahu’s hard-right colleagues (crucial to his government holding together) are vociferously advocating for the impending operation. Netanyahu himself has reverted to the rhetoric of “total victory”.

On May 1, Netanyahu vowed afresh to storm Rafah – “We will enter Rafah and we will eliminate the Hamas battalions there – with or without a deal, in order to achieve total victory."

An old buy-in, with new terms

While the US continues to support Egyptian and Qatari efforts, despite the lack of progress, it is also focused on a greater role for Saudi Arabia to ensure both long-term regional stability as well as post-war reconstruction in Gaza. For Washington, it is imperative to increase incentives for Riyadh to normalise ties with Israel – the prospects of which were high prior to October 7, but have since been far-flung due to Israel’s increasingly unpopular war in Gaza.

Hence, Blinken’s Riyadh visit yielded another significant development - both American and Saudi officials announced that fresh security and defence pacts (with or without mutual defence assistance) between the two states were “nearing completion” in exchange for normalisation.

However, both Blinken as well as the Saudi foreign minister linked the potential agreements to both “calm in Gaza” and a “credible pathway to a Palestinian state”. Evidently, the space to exploit the pre-October 7 high-water mark in contemporary Arab-Israeli ties due to the Abraham Accords is still vital and Washington cannot let its momentum drastically wither.

Arguably, Riyadh learnt from the Abraham Accords that side-stepping the Palestinian question would leave the door open for violent disruptors – jeopardizing even larger plans such as the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor.

Pushing for at least a rough plan for Palestinian statehood would allow Riyadh to be more secure in its normalisation with Israel, with the US-Saudi defence pact as a cherry on top. Note that while Saudi Arabia and UAE had secured a deal with Washington for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems in 2022, Riyadh secured new sub-contracts with Lockheed Martin to manufacture parts of the THAAD system, as recently as February 2024.

With the Saudis positioned as such, the road ahead that Washington desires arguably looks like this - a temporary truce with a hostage/prisoner swap; lobbying for a permanent ceasefire with the remainder of hostages released; Saudi-Israel normalization; an all-stakeholder roadmap for a Palestinian state.

For these immediate expectations, the potential spoilers in the US’ calculus are almost all Israeli - an invasion of (not precision strikes on) Rafah; a rejection of a permanent ceasefire; a rejection of a two-state framework. In any case, Washington has indicated clearly enough that Israel’s aim of completely eliminating Hamas through kinetic measures, is largely unattainable.

In March, the White House explicitly stated that Israel lacks a “coherent and sustainable strategy in Gaza”. This is even as Iran remains the most potent detractor in the region – increasing Washington’s rationale to consolidate Arab support, especially when Arab capitals have made fresh peace with Tehran.

Essentially then, the US is pushing Israel towards a ceasefire and against major offensives like the Rafah plan because (and not despite) it is an ally and Washington can positively influence Israel’s actions far more than it can influence the actions of other disruptors such as Iran.

The incentives-not-coercion approach is what drives continuing US military aid to Israel even as Washington’s political support to Israel’s war dwindles. Moreover, while the US continues to press Hamas to accept a deal, evident in Blinken’s statement on Wednesday, phrases such as “the time (for a ceasefire) is now”, also indicate Washington’s desire for a quick deal, to Israel – even as Netanyahu continues to push the other way.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a research associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi, and a South Asia Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington DC. The views expressed are personal.