On July 18, the Israeli Knesset (its unicameral legislature) passed a resolution rejecting potential Palestinian sovereignty and the ‘two-state solution’ that envisions a stable prosperous Palestinian state alongside Israel. The resolution passed with a significant majority (68 to 9) a day before the International Court of Justice delivered a landmark (non-binding) advisory opinion on July 19, that the UNGA had requested in 2023 on the Israeli occupation of Palestine. While the Court has long categorised much of Israeli action in the occupied territories as being violative of international law, the new ruling is the first direct categorisation of the illegality of Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory. On one hand, the ICJ asked states to obligatorily distinguish between Israel and the occupied territories, called on Israel to cease its illegal occupation and settlement activity, and opined that Israel owed reparations to Palestine for “the damage caused to all natural or legal persons” in occupied territories. On the other, the Knesset resolution declared that it “firmly opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state west of Jordan. The establishment of a Palestinian state in the heart of the Land of Israel will pose an existential danger to the State of Israel and its citizens, perpetuate the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and destabilise the region.”

PREMIUM

More than anything else, it is the sweeping support for the resolution that undoes any lingering perception that the talk of abandoning the two-state solution is only a political instrument of survival for PM Benjamin Netanyahu and the far-right. Support for the resolution from Benny Gantz’s relatively centrist National Unity Party furthers the case in point. Finally, that opposition leaders (such as those from the Yesh Atid and Labour parties) chose to not attend the vote instead of voting against, bodes ill for the two-state conception and how much capital Israeli political parties are willing to expend on it domestically.

The past

The Knesset resolution was more than an immediate response to the (then) impending ICJ opinion. Numerous resolutions of the UNSC and UNGA along with other international bodies have long maintained that both Israel’s occupation as well as its construction of settlements in occupied Palestine are illegal. Historically, Israel’s response to such developments has been vocally critical, in rhetoric, and an aggravation of its occupation through increased settlement activity, in substance. What stands out in the Knesset resolution, however, is the explicit rejection of the two-state solution, which is in some ways unprecedented.

Historically, Israel has acquiesced to the principle, especially since the Oslo Accords (1993, 1995). In 2009, even Netanyahu had endorsed a Palestinian state (albeit with conditions deemed unacceptable by Palestinian leaders). Netanyahu stayed committed to this in principle over the next few years, despite continuing pushback from other far-right leaders who vowed to make it effectively impossible to pass any pro-two-state solution decision in the Knesset. With his own position imperilled by corruption charges and unfavourable judicial verdicts, the fact that Netanyahu has now been strongly disclaiming the two-state solution seemed thus far to be as reflective of his dependence on far-right parties for political survival, as anything else. The Knesset’s resolution is indicative of a larger, more entrenched approach to Israeli policymaking (beyond Netanyahu), historically.

As global opinion (through multilateral institutions or otherwise) has historically converged against Tel Aviv on any issue, Israel has met that convergence with measures to reject such positions, at the same level. For instance, as the UN stepped up its calls for Israel to withdraw from territory it occupied since the 1967 war, Israel responded with an effective annexation of East Jerusalem through the Jerusalem Basic Law of 1980 and reaffirmed the undivided city as Israel’s capital. Even as the UNSC declared the move null and void in Resolution 478 and called on states not to recognise the new capital, Israel persisted across the decades and received a further boost under the Donald Trump administration in 2017, which moved the US Embassy to Jerusalem. This attitude has held true even in its relationship with its strongest ally, the United States, for those issues where the country has maintained a critical stand. In February, March, and July this year, Israel announced a further expansion of settlements in the West Bank, even as the US criticised the move. Testament to how this is a continuation of a long-standing approach is the fact that even when Joe Biden visited Israel as Vice President in 2010, Israel welcomed him by announcing 1,600 new settlements in East Jerusalem (occupied territory) which drew some rebuke from the then VP. Now, as global criticism escalates to generate fresh support for the two-state solution and the ICJ explicitly calls Israel’s occupation illegal, Israel meets it with a rejection at the same rung – shedding its earlier approach of accepting the solution in principle but attaching its own conditions.

The future

The two-state solution is a fact in theory and in law. Even the US, along with the UN, has historically supported the proposition (with Antony Blinken reiterating this position after the Knesset’s resolution). While 145 of the UN’s 193 member-states recognise Palestinian statehood, India has historically stood by the two-state solution, even as its ties with Israel have grown, and has been particularly vociferous in expressing support for Palestinian sovereignty across 2024. Such support for Palestinian statehood by states is grounded as much in geopolitical pragmatism as it is in morality and principle. Given the drift towards stability driven by economic integration that characterised the Middle East prior to October 7, the current crisis has driven home the need to capitalise on this drift by resolving the issue that is most fundamental to West Asian fault lines, before it blows up efforts at stability. The more Israel digs its heels in to counter a Palestinian state, the more it pushes Arab states into making a choice they do not want to make — to give up on a Palestinian state or to reassess their new formal and informal ties with Israel which have already been strained by the IDF’s disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks on civilians in Gaza. In turn, the longer Israel resists a Palestinian state, the greater the risk to grand connectivity projects such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which is heavily contingent on a stable Arab-Israel relationship.

If Israel’s historic adherence to its older decisions vis-à-vis Palestinian sovereignty is any indication, Tel Aviv is more likely to double down on its opposition to Palestine in the short term, than to roll back the resolution. In any case, the future of Middle Eastern stability is now again linked to the more fundamental question of Palestinian statehood, than just to the question of a ceasefire in Gaza. It is this fundamentality that might force Israel to walk back on its decision in the long term, should the political and economic costs eventually become too high to bear. Thus far, these costs have been minimal in substance.

Bashir Ali Abbas is a research associate at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research, New Delhi, and a South Asia Visiting Fellow at the Stimson Center, Washington DC. The views expressed are personal.