Statistics and power dynamics

Caste statistics furnished by the Bihar survey confirm the asymmetrical distribution of population, income and resources among different segments of Bihar society. Among the upper castes or the general category (15.52%), Brahmins and Rajputs return almost identical figures (nearly 3.5%) followed by the Bhumihars (2.8%) and the Kayasthas (0.6%).

Of the OBCs (in all 27.13%), the Yadavs are numerically dominant among all castes (14.26%) followed by the Kushwahas (4.2%) and the Kurmis (2.8%). Among the EBCs (36%), there is no caste that significantly outnumbers others and the population is dispersed among Mallahs (2.6%), Telis (2.81%), Dhanuks (2.1%) and so on. The numerically dominant and politically mobilised castes in the SC category are the Chamars (5.25%), the Dusadhs (5.31%) and the Musahars (3.08%). Sheikhs (3.8%) among upper castes, and Ansaris (3.5 %) among EBCs are the two Muslim groups with a sizable share of the population. Following the bifurcation between Bihar and Jharkhand, the ST share has plunged to a mere 1.7%.

Demographically numbers are important, but the dynamics of power and politics are far more complex. Despite their small numbers, the Kayastha share in government jobs and political representation is disproportionately high. This holds true for other upper castes too, such as the Brahmins, Rajputs and Bhumihars. Bihar data is revealing, for it reports a high incidence of poverty (less than ₹6000 monthly household income) among traditionally prosperous castes such as the Bhumihars and the Rajputs.

Yet, the state’s politics remains profoundly influenced by the agenda set by the parties of Mandal orientation. What is noteworthy is the gradual rise of the middle castes in the domain of politics. The Yadavs still lag behind in public employment and other development indices, however, this has not inhibited their political assertion which has only incremented over the years.

Muslims taken together constitute nearly 18% of the population and contrary to the depictions of a community pampered by secular formations, they remain at the margins in terms of social development and political representation.

However, there are significant variations within, and particularly so between castes of higher status and those considered lower in the social hierarchy. This could spike demands for adequate representation among Muslim lower castes, but their electoral behaviour is unlikely to be different from the rest of their co-religionists.

Recognition and redistribution

Policy and politics are so indistinguishably connected that even a notional separation is unfathomable. Survey data fed into the state government’s decision to enlarge the quantum of quota to 75%, way past the 50% limit imposed by the Supreme Court. This is expected to boost the plank of social justice and serve as an antidote to BJP’s all-encompassing Hindutva ideology that aims to unify Hindus across castes.

A word of caution here: bear in mind that the symbolic politics of representation minus redistribution of assets and resources has allowed the new Hindutva to co-opt OBC and EBC castes within its fold. The social churning spurred by the Mandal wave in the late 1980s and all through the 1990s held out immense hope for the poor and the backwards. Theoretically, social justice promised a blend of both, recognition and redistribution. The Mandal Commission was categorical in its observation that “reservation in government employment and educational institutions, and financial assistance” would remain mere “palliatives” if “backwardness was not tackled at its roots”. Social justice is in need of reinvention, and this is its monumental institutions, and financial assistance” would remain mere “palliatives” if “backwardness was not tackled at its roots”.

It identified the skewed production relations as the source of backwardness and recommended measures for rectification. In the politics of social justice, the poor, mostly of low-caste origins, sought liberation from their everyday humiliation and deprivation. But their hope turned into despair, as justice got confined to symbolism. It benefited the middle classes among the backward castes but left large sections of their populations annoyed and resentful. Hindutva found an easy entry.

Angry street protests had followed the implementation of Mandal, but the Bihar decision faced none. Across the political spectrum, there is an endorsement of the decision. Additionally, the alarming incidence of poverty among social groups makes social and economic justice inseparable. Social justice is in need of reinvention, and this is its moment.

Dr Tanweer Fazal is professor of Sociology, University of Hyderabad, and the author of"Nation-state" and Minority Rights in India: Comparative Perspectives on Muslim and Sikh Identities