A contra-polar world is the new political reality

United States (US) President Donald Trump will make a high-visibility two-day trip to India, starting Monday. His first stop will be Ahmedabad, where he will be received by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Referring to his maiden visit, Trump said: “He [Modi] told me we will have 7 million people between the airport and the event.” The event will be similar to the “Howdy Modi” extravaganza in Houston, Texas, in September, where Trump also made an appearance at a large gathering of the Indian-origin diaspora in the US.

However the scale of this public diplomacy will be in contrast to the modest outcome during the formal meetings in Delhi. Speaking on February 18 about his first visit to India, Trump dashed hopes of any major trade deal. “We can have a trade deal with India but I am really saving the big trade deal for later on.”

In the Trump worldview, India has been a difficult trade interlocutor and he has, in the past, accused Delhi of being the world’s “tariff king”, and the Harley Davidson motorbike episode has become the symbol of presidential ire. According to the United States Trade Representative data, in 2018, the US trade deficit with India was $25.2 billion, of which the goods trade deficit was $20.8 billion. Hence Trump asserted, “We are not treated very well by India but I happen to like prime minister Modi a lot.” This puts Modi in a special category, for there are not too many global leaders who have received such positive endorsement from Trump, despite differences, and a reflection of deft Indian diplomacy.

But as expected, while the trade relationship is in the doldrums over tariff issues and dismay in Delhi about the US removing India from the list of “developing” countries, the military supplies’ relationship remains robust and points to a shared albeit unequal strategic partnership in the maritime domain.

On February 19, the Indian Cabinet approved a $2. 6-billion-acquisition of 24 US- made (Lockheed Martin) multi-role helicopters for the Navy. This arms deal is expected to be among the more substantive outcomes of the Trump visit and will strengthen the bilateral defence and security relationship that acquired greater traction in 2009.

This followed the historic rapprochement between the US and India in late 2008 after decades of bitter estrangement over the nuclear issue that was resolved during the George Bush-Manmohan Singh watch. The trigger in Washington for this accommodation of India was strategic and China-related. The core Bush team, led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, had arrived at a determination in early 2005 that an intractable estrangement with India was not in the larger US strategic interest against the backdrop of a rising China that was becoming more assertive. Hence the radical review by the White House of the bilateral ties with India.

Fifteen years later, while the broad orientation of the bilateral relationship remains consistent with what was envisioned in 2005, the cost-benefit analysis in Washington apropos India has undergone a Trump transmutation.

China remains a strategic concern for Washington but the current White House team is diluting its commitment to globalisation and free-trade to protect US interests. The ensuing turbulence has had its impact on both Beijing and Delhi, and the Trump visit reflects this unrelenting focus on the transactional element and the benefits that would accrue for the re-election campaign of the US President.

In the elliptical manner that Trump policies are modified, he added about the India visit: “We are doing a very big trade deal with India. We will have it. I don’t know whether we will have it before the [US] election, but we will have a very big deal with India.”

The fact that India is a major democracy was earlier seen in the US as a distinctive characteristic, to be encouraged. This is no longer the primary driver of the bilateral relationship. India is not among the top five trading partners of the US and is not a formal military ally. Many areas of dissonance exist, ranging from the US’s policy towards Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran and Washington’s unhappiness with India over the supply of certain Russia military equipment.

Given its lower index of comprehensive national power in relation to the US and China, India has to engage in the equivalent of subaltern tightrope, walking to strike the appropriate balance in the complex relationship that animates the Washington-Beijing-Delhi strategic triangle. India has a deep security and strategic trust deficit with China but seeks to improve the trade and economic relationship with Beijing to reach the coveted $5- trillion GDP figure that Modi aspires to reach by 2024. Consequently, India will have to work towards enhancing its trade footprint with the top two global economies — the US and China — even while managing the individual security-strategic dissonances. The security engagement with the US enables India to better manage its China dilemma.

The US policy towards China is in a state of flux over trade matters, now compounded by the coronavirus challenge, but the final Trump-Modi statement will be closely studied in Beijing for its strategic subtext.

The Trump visit to India testifies to the emergence of what may be termed a “contra-polar” world, wherein contradictory policy pursuits and contrarian impulses are increasingly becoming the norm.